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Abstract
This paper reexamines the GATT/WTO membership effect on bilateral trade flows, using
nonparametric methods including pair-matching, permutation tests, and a Rosenbaum (2002)
sensitivity analysis. Together, these methods provide an estimation framework that is robust to
misspecification biases, allows general forms of heterogeneous treatment effects, and addresses
potential hidden selection biases. This is in contrast to most conventional parametric stud-
ies on this issue. Our results suggest large GATT/WTO trade-promoting effects, robust to
various restricted matching criteria, alternative indicators for GATT/WTO involvement, dif-
ferent matching methodologies, non-random incidence of positive trade flows, and inclusion of
multilateral resistance terms.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the GATT/WTO effect on bilateral trade flows in the empirical trade literature
has largely relied on parametric estimation of gravity-type models, where the volume of trade
between two countries is hypothesized to vary proportionally with the product of their economic
sizes and the factor of proportionality to depend on trade resistance measures (Anderson, 1979;
Bergstrand, 1985; Deardorff, 1998; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). A pioneering study by Rose
(2004) suggests that GATT/WTO-membership dummies fail to reveal any statistically significant
and robust influence on the volume of bilateral trade, while more recent studies by Tomz et al.
(2007) and Subramanian and Wei (2007) suggest more positive findings when looking at alternative
indicators of GATT/WTO involvement or at certain subsets of the sample.
In this paper, we use nonparametric methods to re-evaluate the GATT/WTO membership effect
on bilateral trade flows. First, we apply pair-matching methods to obtain point effect estimates.
By using the matching method, we avoid potential parametric misspecifications and allow for het-
erogeneous treatment (i.e. membership) effects, which appear to be an important element of the
current application. The matching framework allows the treatment effects to vary with observed
covariates, and thus allows more general forms of heterogeneity than Subramanian and Wei (2007).
Second, given a panel of bilateral trade data, which likely have a complicated data structure with
serial and spatial dependence to render the derivation of asymptotic tests for matching estimators
difficult, this paper applies permutation tests which circumvent the above problem. Permutation
tests are nonparametric and exact inferences; they are also straightforward to implement in the
matching framework. We generalize the test to explicitly allow for heterogeneous treatment effects
in constructing the confidence intervals for the mean effect. Third, the paper conducts a nonpara-
metric sensitivity analysis following Rosenbaum (2002) to formally address potential biases due to
unobserved self-selection into treatment. We put together these methods in a coherent manner
such that they can be easily applied to other treatment effect problems of similar nature.
Applying the nonparametric methods to the Rose (2004) data set, this paper reaches a con-
clusion that is in stark contrast with Rose (2004): membership in the GATT/WTO has large
and significant trade-promoting effects. We explore robustness of this result to various possible
critiques.
First, both parametric gravity and nonparametric matching estimators rely on the assump-
tion of ‘selection on observables’ and assume away non-random selection into treatment based on
unobservables. This assumption may fail if there are important omitted variables. The Rosen-
baum (2002) sensitivity analysis partly addresses this problem. Alternatively, we also conduct
restricted matching, where we further limit the match to observations from the same dyad (where
a dyad stand for two trading countries), the same year/period, or the same relative development
stage. This eliminates potential biases arising from unobservable heterogeneity across dyads, years,
GATT/WTO periods, or countries of different development stages.
Second, Tomz et al. (2007) emphasize the importance of de facto participation in the GATT/WTO
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by colonies, newly independent nations and provisional members, and find strong GATT/WTO ef-
fects on trade when these types of nonmember participation is taken into account. We conduct the
same nonparametric analysis using the data set of Tomz et al. (2007) and find even stronger results
than those based on the Rose (2004) data set.
Third, we verify the robustness of pair-matching by conducting ‘kernel-weighting matching’
which allows multiple matches for a subject while assigning greater weights to closer matches. The
kernel-weighting matching effect estimates are very similar to pair-matching estimates.
Fourth, by using the data set of Rose (2004) or Tomz et al. (2007), we have based our analysis on
observations with positive trade flows. Studies by Helpman et al. (2008) and Felbermayr and Kohler
(2007) suggest that the incidence of positive trade flows may not be random. To address possible
biases due to non-random incidence of active trading relationships, we apply our nonparametric
procedures to a subset of the Rose (2004) data set where a dyad have reported bilateral trade
flows before they ever join the GATT/WTO. For these observations, the membership effect on
prompting new trading relationships is not relevant and the effect estimates correspond to only the
membership effect on trade volumes. We find overall stronger effect estimates based on this refined
analysis.
Fifth, relative trade resistance rather than absolute trade resistance is argued by some gravity
theories to be more appropriate in explaining bilateral trade flows, cf. Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), and multilateral resistance terms may have to be controlled for. We follow recent studies
by Baier and Bergstrand (2009a,b) to approximate the endogenous multilateral resistance terms
by observable exogenous trade resistance covariates and to control for time-varying multilateral
resistance terms in the matching framework. The strong effects of GATT/WTO still remain.
Finally, we explore an alternative treatment effect concept, difference-in-difference, that is based
on weaker identification assumptions and thus is more robust to potential biases due to selection on
unobservables. This method compares the difference over time in trade volumes of a treated dyad
to that of a comparable untreated dyad. The matching estimates indicate that the GATT/WTO
membership effects are negligible in early phases of the treatment but become statistically and
economically significant five or six years into the treatment. To complete the analysis, we conduct
“placebo” exercises and verify that the time trends of trade flows of matched dyads are comparable
in advance of membership, dismissing concerns that the difference-in-difference estimates may be
picking up systematic differences in time trends between the treatment and control group due to
unobservables not controlled for.
The discrepancy between the findings of the current nonparametric approach and the conven-
tional parametric approach suggests that conventional gravity models may be misspecified. We
explore generalizing the gravity model’s specifications to reduce the discrepancy. Our limited
search suggests that the assumption of homogeneous membership effects could be a major source
of misspecification. By allowing the membership dummies to interact with observed covariates
(and hence allowing the membership effects to vary with dyad-specific characteristics), we find the
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parametric effect estimates to become significant and positive. However, more research into the
nature of heterogeneous membership effects seems desirable and we leave this for future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the nonparametric procedures.
Section 3 explains the data used. Sections 4 and 5 present our benchmark estimation results and
robustness checks. Section 6 explores potential misspecifications of the gravity models. Section 7
concludes.
2. METHODOLOGY
2.1 Mean Effects and Matching
Recall that a ‘dyad’ indicate two trading countries. An observation unit is a dyad i in a
year t; a matched ‘pair’ are two observation units matched on covariates. Let dit denote the
observed treatment status of a dyad i in year t, where dit = 1 if the subject it is treated and
0 if untreated. The treatment dummy dit takes on different meanings as the treatment under
investigation changes. For example, a dyad-year subject is ‘both-in’ treated if both countries of the
dyad in the year are GATT/WTO members and untreated if both are nonmembers. Define y1it (y
0
it)
as the potential treated (untreated) response; in our application, this corresponds to the potential
treated (untreated) bilateral trade volume for the dyad-year subject it. Let yit ≡ dity1it+(1−dit)y0it
denote the observed response. Finally, let xit denote the observed covariates for the dyad-year
subject it that could potentially affect the treatment and response. Label the group of treated
observations ‘the treatment group’ and the group of untreated observations ‘the control group’. In
the following, we will often omit the subscript it to simplify presentations.
In observational data, treatment d is self-selected. Matching on x helps removing the ‘overt
selection bias’ caused by observed differences across the treatment and control group. By condi-
tioning on x, one can identify the conditional mean effect E(y1 − y0|x) with the conditional group
mean difference:
E(y|d = 1, x)− E(y|d = 0, x) = E(y1|d = 1, x)−E(y0|d = 0, x) = E(y1 − y0|x) if (y0, y1)q d|x,
where (y0, y1) q d|x states that both the potential treated and untreated response (y0, y1) are
independent of d given x. This condition is the identifying ‘selection on observables’ assumption—
that is, the only source of selection bias is via the observed covariates; the selection into treatment
is random once x is controlled for. The same assumption is required for parametric regression
approaches.
A weaker identifying assumption y0 q d|x is sufficient if one is only interested in the ‘effect on
the treated’, as under the assumption,
E(y|d = 1, x)−E(y|d = 0, x) = E(y1|d = 1, x)− E(y0|d = 0, x)
= E(y1|d = 1, x)− E(y0|d = 1, x) = E(y1 − y0|d = 1, x).
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Alternatively, the assumption y1 q d|x is sufficient to identify the ‘effect on the untreated’ E(y1 −
y0|d = 0, x). Once the x-conditional effect is found, x can be integrated out to yield a marginal
effect. For example, for the effect on the treated, the distribution F (x|d = 1) of x|d = 1 is typically
used to render
E(y1 − y0|d = 1) =
∫
E(y1 − y0|d = 1, x)dF (x|d = 1).
This framework of first finding the x-conditional effect (on all, on the treated, or on the untreated)
allows for possibly heterogeneous treatment effects across dyad-year subjects that differ in x. The
unconditional mean effect then reflects the average of the heterogeneous x-conditional treatment
effects weighted by the frequency of x. It is this average effect (on all, on the treated, or on the
untreated) that we estimate. This departs from the parametric gravity regression approach, where
a homogeneous treatment effect regardless of x is typically assumed.
Matching for the effect on the treated can be carried out as follows. First, a treated subject, say
subject it, is selected. Second, control subjects are selected who are the closest to the treated subject
it in terms of x, based on the simple scale-normalized distance measure, (xit−xi′t′)Σ−1x (xit−xi′t′)′,
where Σx is a diagonal matrix with the sample variances of the covariates in the pooled sample on
the diagonal and i′t′ refers to a control subject. As x in our data includes continuous variables (cf.
Section 3), the likelihood of multiple-matching (multiple control subjects being the closest match)
is negligible; thus, we restrict our attention to pair-matching (a unique control subject being the
closest match). Third, given pair-matching, suppose there are M pairs (where M is the number of
treated subjects that successfully find a match), and ym1 and ym2 are the trade volumes of the two
subjects in pair m ordered such that ym1 > ym2 without loss of generality. Then, defining sm = 1 if
the first subject in pair m is treated and −1 otherwise, the effect on the treated can be estimated
with
D ≡ 1
M
M∑
m=1
sm(ym1 − ym2)→p E(y1 − y0|d = 1) under y0 q d|x, (1)
which is the average of the pair-wise differences. For a treated subject, if there is no good matching
control, the subject may be passed over; i.e., a ‘caliper’ c may be set such that a treated subject
it with mini′t′∈C ‖xit − xi′t′‖ > c is discarded, where ‘i′t′ ∈ C’ indicates subjects in the control
group. The above matching scheme can be reversed to result in an estimator for the effect on the
untreated: a control subject is selected first and then a matching subject from the treatment group
later. For the effect on all, D simply includes all (treated and control) subjects who can find a
good match.
In addition to the possibility of allowing for heterogeneous treatment effects, another advantage
of taking the nonparametric matching approach is to avoid the misspecification bias that may
arise in the parametric approach due to misspecifications of the regression functional form. Pair-
matching, which matches subjects who differ in their treatment (e.g. membership) status but are
otherwise similar in their covariates, allows arbitrary functional forms of the covariates.
Matching is widely used in labor and health economics. See, e.g., Heckman et al. (1997) and
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Imbens (2004), and applications in Heckman et al. (1998), Lechner (2000), and Lu et al. (2001).
Matching methods have also started to appear in international economics studies such as Persson
(2001) of the currency union effect and Baier and Bergstrand (2009b) of the free trade agreement
effect. For more discussions on treatment effect and matching in general, see Rosenbaum (2002)
and Lee (2005).
2.2 Permutation Test for Matched Pairs
Although matching estimators are popular in practice, their asymptotic properties are not fully
understood.1 In practice, a standard t-statistic or a bootstrap procedure is often used to derive the
p-value or the confidence interval (CI). The standard t-statistic is straightforward but theoretical
justifications in most cases are not available; bootstrap is computationally demanding and is argued
by Abadie and Imbens (2006) to be invalid. In this paper, we propose using permutation tests.
Permutation tests invoke the concept of exchangeability that under the null hypothesis H0
of no effect, potential treated and untreated responses are exchangeable without affecting their
joint distribution: F (y0it, y
1
it|x) = F (y1it, y0it|x). This implies that under the null, the two potential
responses have the same marginal distribution and hence the same mean given x. Thus, we can
test the equal mean (i.e. zero mean effect) implication of the null.
It is straightforward to carry out the permutation test described above for matched pairs and
test for a zero mean effect under the null. Under the null hypothesis of exchangeability, the two
subjects in each matched pair are exchangeable in the labeling of their treatment status (treated or
untreated). In each permutation of ‘pseudo’ treatment assignment, one can calculate the ‘pseudo’
effect estimate. By obtaining all possible 2M permutations of the treatment labels in all M pairs,
one can calculate the exact p-value of the observed mean effect estimate D by placing it in the
“empirical” distribution of the pseudo effect estimates.
When M is large (as in the current application), such that the number of permutations is huge,
one can approximate the exact p-value by simulating only a subset (say, 1000) of permutation
possibilities from the complete permutation space and comparing the observed effect estimate D
against the simulated sample of pseudo effect estimates. Alternatively, one can apply normal
approximation. Note that in a permutation, the obtained pseudo effect estimator can be written
as D′ ≡ 1M
∑M
m=1wmsm(ym1 − ym2), where wm, m = 1, ...,M , is a iid random variable such that
P (wm = 1) = P (wm = −1) = 0.5. That is, the treatment labels of the two responses in pair m are
exchanged if wm = −1, and no exchange otherwise. We show in the appendix that conditional on
the observed data, the exact p-value of D can be approximated by
P (D′ ≥ D) ' P
{
N(0, 1) ≥ D{∑Mm=1(ym1 − ym2)2/M2}1/2
}
, (2)
which turns out to use the same t-statistic as the conventional two-sample test. Thus, this display
1See, however, exceptions such as Abadie and Imbens (2006) for the case of iid data.
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incidentally provides a theoretical justification for the common practice of using the t-statistic
to evaluate the significance of matching estimators, although we have derived (2) from an exact
inferential approach (i.e. permutation with respect to the treatment labels but conditional on the
observed data) and not based on asymptotic distribution theories (i.e. sampling with respect to the
data).
In addition to testing the null hypothesis of a zero mean effect, one may also be interested in an
interval estimate of the mean effect. We show in the appendix how to obtain the CI for the mean
effect by “inverting” the above test (see, e.g., Lehmann and Romano, 2005). It is worth noting
that in deriving the CI, we generalize the inverting procedure to explicitly allow for heterogeneous
treatment effects.
As indicated above, permutation inference methods have several advantages: (i) they are non-
parametric as they do not require distributional assumptions on the response, other than the ex-
changeability condition, (ii) they are exact inferences despite making no parametric distributional
assumptions in small samples, and they are often equivalent to conventional asymptotic inference
methods in large samples when normal approximation is used. On the other hand, as permutation
tests invoke a stronger concept of no effect (on the distribution), this rules out testing for null
hypotheses of no effect that still allow some changes in the distribution. In small samples where
normal approximation does not apply, permutation tests may also be computer-intensive. Both
disadvantages, however, are not important in the current application.
Permutation tests, in stead of asymptotic tests, are especially convenient in the current appli-
cation with a panel of bilateral trade data, which possibly have a complicated data structure with
serial and spatial dependence, rendering the derivation of asymptotic properties for the matching
estimator difficult if not impossible. By relying on exchangeability as the null hypothesis of no
effect, the permutation test can accommodate potentially a wide range of data structures. For
example, suppose that the joint distribution F (y0it, y
1
it|x) is normal. In this scenario, the exchange-
ability condition requires only that the treated and untreated responses have the same variance
conditional on x. This allows for heteroskedasticity (i.e. variances of responses to vary with x) or
correlation across time or observation units.
Permutation tests have a long history in statistics since Fisher (1935) and are widely used in
statistics and medicine. Recently, Imbens and Rosenbaum (2005) applied permutation inference to
well-known “weak instrument” data in economics to find that only permutation methods provided
reliable inference. Ho and Imai (2006) also applied permutation inference to a political science data
set. As can be seen in these examples, the application of permutation methods is fairly new in
social sciences. See Hollander and Wolfe (1999), Pesarin (2001), Ernst (2004), and Lehmann and
Romano (2005) among others, for more on permutation (or randomization) tests in general.
2.3 Signed-Rank Test for Matched Pairs
Instead of the difference in response sm(ym1− ym2), we can apply the permutation inference to
the “signed rank” of the difference in response. The advantage is that rank-based tests are more
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robust to outliers. In addition, the ensuing Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis can be applied
to the signed-rank test easily. The disadvantage on the other hand is that such rank-based tests
are geared more to testing for no effect rather than to estimating the effect itself, which results in
a roundabout way of getting the point estimate and CI (as shown in the appendix). Since these
estimates can only be derived under the assumption of homogeneous treatment effects, in contrast
with those in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, they are of less interest to the current application. However, it
is important to note that the signed-rank test itself and the corresponding sensitivity analysis are
valid against an alternative of either homogeneous or heterogeneous treatment effects.
Applying the Wilcoxon (1945) signed-rank test to the current context, rank |ym1 − ym2|, m =
1, ...,M , and denote the resulting ranks as r1, ..., rM , where a larger rank rm corresponds to a larger
absolute difference in response. The signed-rank statistic is then the sum of the ranks of the pairs
where the treated subject has the higher response:
R ≡
M∑
m=1
rm1[sm = 1].
The p-value of the R-statistic can be obtained by the pseudo-sample simulation procedure or the
normal approximation method as discussed in Section 2.2. In particular, we show in the appendix
that when M is large, the normally approximated p-value for R under the null hypothesis of
exchangeability is
P (R′ ≥ R) ' P
{
N(0, 1) ≥ R − E(R
′)
V (R′)1/2
}
, (3)
whereR′ is the permuted version ofR, E(R′) =M(M + 1)/4, and V (R′) =M(M + 1)(2M + 1)/24.
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis with Signed-Rank Test
The key identifying assumption for the matching estimator is the ‘selection on observables’
condition as noted in Section 2.1. The same condition is also required for parametric regression
approaches. This condition may fail if there are omitted third variables or unobservables that
affect both the treatment d (the decision to join the GATT/WTO) and the response y (the trade
flows). In a parametric framework, one may deal with this problem of ‘selection on unobservables’
using techniques such as Heckman’s (1979). In a nonparametric framework as ours, the Rosenbaum
(2002) sensitivity analysis provides a convenient way to account for selection on unobservables.
The analysis is structured as follows. Suppose that the treatment d is affected by an unobserved
confounder ε. Then, two subjects in a matched pair with the same x but possibly different ε may
have different probabilities of taking the treatment. Let the odds ratio of taking the treatment
across all pairs be bounded between 1/Γ and Γ for some constant Γ ≥ 1. For instance, if the first
subject’s probability of taking the treatment is 0.6 and the second subject’s 0.5, the odds ratio is
(0.6/0.4)/(0.5/0.5) = 1.5.
Given the bounds on the odds ratio, Rosenbaum (2002) shows that one could derive the corre-
sponding bounds on the significance level of many rank-sum statistics under the null hypothesis of
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no effect. This places bounds on the significance level that would have been appropriate had ε been
observed. The sensitivity analysis for a significance level starts with the scenario of no hidden bias
(Γ = 1). The sensitivity parameter Γ is then increased from 1 to see how the initial conclusion is
affected. If it takes a large value of Γ (i.e., a large deviation from 1 in the odds ratio) to eliminate
an original finding of a significant effect or to overturn an original finding of no effect, the initial
conclusion is deemed robust to unobserved confounders; otherwise, the initial finding is sensitive.
We show in the appendix how to apply the Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis to the signed-
rank statistic and derive the bounds on the significance level (the p-value) of the observed statistic
R under the null of no effect. In particular, for a given degree Γ ≥ 1 of departure from the state of
no hidden bias, define p+ ≡ Γ1+Γ ≥ 0.5 and p− ≡ 11+Γ ≤ 0.5. The p-value of the observed statistic
R is bounded as follows:
P (R+ ≥ R) ≥ P (R′ ≥ R) ≥ P (R− ≥ R), (4)
where R+ ≡ ∑Mm=1 rmum with P (um = 1) = p+ and P (um = 0) = 1 − p+, and likewise for R−.
Note that the means and variances of R+ and R− include E(R′) and V (R′) as a special case when
p+ = p− = 1/2 under no hidden bias.
Specifically, suppose that the H0-rejection interval is in the upper tail, and the p-value assuming
no hidden bias is P (R′ ≥ R) = 0.001, leading to the rejection of H0 at level α > 0.001. By allowing
an unobserved confounder to cause the odds ratio to deviate from 1 and up to (1/Γ,Γ), the correct
tail probability is unknown but is bounded above by P (R+ ≥ R) ' P{N(0, 1) ≥ R−E(R+)
SD(R+)
}. The
upper bound can be obtained for different values of Γ to find the critical value Γ∗ at which the
upper bound crosses the level α.
The relevant distribution (R+ or R−) to use for the sensitivity analysis corresponds to the
direction of hidden bias that would undermine an initial finding of a significant treatment effect or
reverse an initial finding of no effect. For example, if the finding is a significantly positive effect,
we only need to worry about ‘positive’ selection, where a subject with a higher potential treatment
effect is also more likely to be treated; thus, the relevant distribution is R+ that embodies selection
bias in this direction. On the other hand, if the finding is a significantly negative effect, then
‘negative’ selection where a subject with a lower potential treatment effect is also more likely to be
treated can reverse or weaken the original finding; in this case, the sensitivity analysis with R− is
applicable.
As reviewed in the appendix, there exist alternative approaches of sensitivity analysis, but they
are typically parametric in nature or not applicable to cases with continuous response variables. In
comparison, the Rosenbaum (2002) approach imposes relatively mild assumptions (that the odds
ratio of subjects matched on x be bounded between 1/Γ and Γ) and is straightforward to apply.
While most other approaches specify how the unobserved confounder affects both the treatment
and response, the Rosenbaum (2002) approach focuses only on how the unobservable may affect the
treatment. Thus, the Rosenbaum (2002) approach is likely more robust to parametric misspecifica-
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tions (and at the same time, conservative). On the other hand, by leaving the relationship between
the unobserved confounder and the response unspecified, this approach cannot in general construct
bias-adjusted effect estimates as in parametric approaches (of the sensitivity analysis nature or of
the Heckman type). Instead, this approach evaluates how robust the effect estimate obtained under
the assumption of no hidden bias is to the unobserved selection problem. This sensitivity analysis
ultimately relies on the researcher’s judgement of whether the critical value Γ∗ at which the initial
significance finding reverses is considered large enough. In general, the more important covariates
are included in x and the smaller the likelihood of unobserved confounders to make Γ deviate much
from 1, the smaller a threshold value may be adopted. Roughly speaking, we will adopt a threshold
of 1.5; see Aakvik (2001) and Hujer et al. (2004) for similar stances.
3. DATA DESCRIPTION
We use the Rose (2004) data set (faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/GATTdataStata.zip). Read-
ers are referred to the source for a detailed account of the data. We will also use the Tomz et al.
(2007) data set in Section 5.2 below.
We use the same set of covariates as in Rose (2004) to allow comparison with the studies in this
literature that mostly use the same set of covariates but follow parametric regression approaches.
The covariates x include ldist (the log distance of a dyad), lrgdp (the log product of a dyad’s real
GDP’s), lrgdppc (the log product of a dyad’s real GDP’s per capita), comlang (= 1 if a dyad share
a common language), border (= 1 if a dyad share a land border), landl (= the number of landlocked
countries in a dyad), island (= the number of island nations in a dyad), lareap (the log product of
a dyad’s land areas), comcol (= 1 if a dyad were ever colonies after 1945 with the same colonizer),
curcol (= 1 if a dyad are in a colonial relationship), colony (= 1 if a dyad were ever in a colonial
relationship), comctry (= 1 if a dyad remained part of the same nation during the sample period),
custrict (= 1 if a dyad use the same currency), regional (= 1 if a dyad belong to the same regional
trade agreement), and year dummies for t = 1948, . . . , 1999.
The response variable is ltrade (the log average value of a dyad’s current real bilateral trade
flows). In addition to the GATT/WTO membership effect, we also evaluate the treatment effect of
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); this bilateral trade preference arrangement was found
by Rose (2004) to have stronger trade effects than membership in the GATT/WTO. In particular,
the treatment effects of both-in, one-in, and GSP are evaluated and the treatment indicator variable
d corresponds to: bothin (= 1 if both countries in a dyad are GATT/WTO members, and = 0 if
both are nonmembers), onein (= 1 if only one country in a dyad is a GATT/WTO member, and
= 0 if both are nonmembers), or gsp (= 1 if a dyad have a GSP arrangement, and = 0 if not).
When the GSP effect is evaluated, the other two dummy variables (bothin and onein) are used
as part of the covariates; when the both-in or one-in effect is evaluated, gsp is used as one of the
covariates.
The data set includes 234,597 observations on trade flows among 178 IMF trading entities
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between 1948 and 1999 (with some “gaps” and missing observations). There are 12,150 distinct
dyads and on average about 19 observations for each dyad. Table 1 gives the summary statistics of
the covariates across three groups of observations by their joint membership status (both in, one
in, or none in). The control (none-in) dyads on average tend to be closer in distance, smaller in
economic sizes, poorer, and appear in earlier years. Based on simple logistic regressions, Table 2
shows that most of the observable covariates affect the selection into membership, and their selection
effects (in terms of odds) are statistically significant (different from one). For example, dyads that
are farther apart from each other, larger in economic sizes, have landlocked nations, have island
nations, have colonial ties, use the same currency, and have a GSP relationship are more likely to
be GATT/WTO members.
A typical concern about the use of matching methods is the extent of overlapping support of the
distribution of observable covariates between the treatment and control group. Figure 1 provides
one such visual check often used in the literature, where based on the same logistic regression as
above, the propensity score of an observation taking the treatment is estimated and its frequencies
tabulated across the treatment and control group. The histograms in Figure 1 show that the
supports of the propensity score overlap fairly well between the both-in treated and control group,
or between the one-in treated and control group.
4. BENCHMARK RESULTS
The benchmark results based on the Rose (2004) data set are shown in Table 3, labeled ‘un-
restricted matching’. The number of matched pairs for the effect on the treated (untreated) is
indicated by M1 (M0). We set the caliper such that only the best 100%, 80%, 60%, or 40% of
matched pairs obtained are included in the analysis. With the caliper choice of 60%, for example,
the matched pairs with the quadratic distance exceeding the upper 60 percentile of all matched
pairs obtained are discarded. The caliper choice of 100% is equivalent to using all matched pairs.
Table 4 describes what kinds of observations are dropped as poor matches by tight calipers. As
indicated in Table 1, the control (none-in) dyads are on average smaller in economic sizes, poorer,
and appear in earlier years. Thus, Table 4 shows that as the caliper gets tightened, the right tail
of the treated (both-in or one-in) dyads are trimmed in the estimation of the effect on the treated
and the left tail of the untreated (none-in) dyads are trimmed in the estimation of the effect on
the untreated, as they are the ones that cannot find good matches from the other group. For
example, as the 80% caliper is set, the both-in dyads that are on average the biggest in economic
sizes (E(lrgdp) = 49.030), the richest (E(lrgdppc) = 17.010), and appear in the most recent years
(E(year) = 1987.8) are dropped first. As the 60% caliper is set, the next biggest, the next richest,
and the next most recent both-in dyads are dropped. The reverse is generally true for the none-in
dyads. Some examples are the United States, Germany, and Japan, who have been among the
richest countries and joined the GATT in 1948, 1951, and 1955, respectively. Most ‘US-Japan’
both-in observations are dropped with the 80% caliper and all are dropped with the 60% caliper;
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similarly, only 10 out of 49 ‘US-Germany’ both-in observations are kept with the 60% caliper and
all are removed with the 40% caliper.
4.1 Both-In Effects
Turn back to Table 3. Note that when the both-in treatment effect is studied, the one-in
observations are dropped. Column (i) shows a large mean effect on the treated: membership in
the GATT/WTO by both countries on average raises bilateral trade volume by 74% (= e0.553 − 1)
to 277% (= e1.328 − 1) for dyads who both chose to be in the GATT/WTO. These effects are
significantly positive, regardless of the caliper choice, as the corresponding p-values in column (ii)
or CI’s in (iii) indicate. The point and interval effect estimates in (iv) and (vi) based on the signed-
rank statistic are obtained under the stronger assumption of homogeneous treatment effects, as
mentioned in Section 2.3 and explained in detail in the appendix, but they appear to be in an order
of magnitude similar to those of (i) and (iii) reported above. This could indicate that the ranks are
not substantially affected by subtracting a uniform effect from all pairs instead of a hypothetically
heterogeneous effect from each pair. Recall that the p-value of the R-statistic in (v) is valid against
homogeneous or heterogeneous treatment effects; the results are similar to those of (ii) and clearly
reject the null hypothesis of no effect. We note the similarity in the results obtained based on the
D-statistic and the R-statistic, and will henceforth focus on the effect estimates of the former that
allows for heterogeneous effects.
How robust is the finding of a significant both-in effect to the possibility of unobserved con-
founders? Since the finding is a positive effect, only positive selection is a concern. Results of the
sensitivity analysis indicate that the positive both-in effect is robust to a positive selection (cf. R+)
to the extent that the odds of a treated subject taking the treatment is not more than 2.081 times
that of a comparable untreated subject in terms of observed covariates (by the 80% caliper and
the two-sided test). The robustness is stronger with a one-sided test (naturally) and with a larger
caliper choice, with Γ∗ ranging from 1.467 to 2.434. In similar sensitivity analyses, Aakvik (2001),
Hujer et al. (2004), Caliendo et al. (2005), Hujer and Thomsen (2006), and Lee and Lee (2009)
seem to adopt a threshold around 1.5. By this threshold, the above finding of a positive both-in
effect is reasonably robust to hidden selection biases. In addition to the Rosenbaum (2002) sensi-
tivity analysis, we will also conduct further refinements of the matching procedure in Section 5.1
to reduce potential sources of unobserved heterogeneity across the treatment and control group.
Relative to the both-in effect on the treated, the both-in effect on the untreated is smaller and
less robust to potential hidden biases. The estimates suggest that bilateral trade volumes would
have increased by 20% (= e0.185−1) to 40% (= e0.337−1) if the nonmember dyads were to both join
the GATT/WTO. Overall, the mean both-in effect on all trading relationships (mainly driven by the
effect on the treated) is positive and significant, with the estimates ranging from 53% (= e0.428−1)
to 224% (= e1.175−1). Given that the estimates of the effect on the untreated are more sensitive to
hidden biases, the empirical evidence for a positive potential both-in effect for nonmember dyads
is not as strong as the realized both-in effect for member dyads. Similar observations apply to the
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one-in treatment analyzed below. Although there are exceptions as various robustness checks are
performed below, the evidence for a positive membership/participation effect on the untreated is
not strong. Thus, our discussions will henceforth focus on the effect on the treated.
On theoretical grounds, there are several economic models that lead one to expect a positive
both-in effect on trade. Among others, the terms-of-trade argument (Johnson, 1953–1954; Bagwell
and Staiger, 1999, 2001) suggests that multilateral trade agreements help coordinate countries’
trade policies and remove their terms-of-trade incentives to raise trade barriers. The terms-of-trade
incentive is shown by Broda et al. (2008) to be an important factor in non-WTO countries’ trade
policy. The political-commitment argument (Staiger and Tabellini, 1987, 1989, 1999), on the other
hand, suggests that multilateral trade agreements help national governments commit themselves
to liberalized trade policies, which brings about efficient production and trade structures.
In spite of the above theories, there are several empirical difficulties in using membership to
measure the GATT/WTO effect, as noted by many in the literature, cf. Rose (in press). First,
tariff reductions and policy liberalizations do not necessarily coincide with the date of accession.
Second, some GATT/WTO members may extend their most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to
nonmember trading partners. Third, some countries (particularly developing countries) did not
liberalize their trade policies in spite of their membership in the GATT (although this is less the
case under the WTO). Fourth, some sectors (e.g. oils and minerals) face little protectionism with
or without the GATT/WTO, while some (e.g. agriculture) are highly protected with or without
the GATT/WTO. The first two considerations imply that membership is a noisy measure and the
estimates will be downward biased, while the last two imply that GATT/WTO effect is heteroge-
neous with no effect in some cases. The fact that we obtained positive significant effects implies
that on average across many trading relationships, the theoretical both-in effect is strong enough
to dominate the above factors and to leave an empirically measurable impact.
4.2 One-In and GSP Effects
Unlike the both-in effect where one may expect a positive effect, or a zero effect at worst, a priori,
the one-in effect can take either sign. On one hand, import diversion by the new member from
its nonmember trading partner to other member trading partners may lower the dyad’s bilateral
trade volumes. On the other hand, in many cases, when a country joins the GATT/WTO, its tariff
reductions (and other policy liberalizations) offered to members on a MFN basis are also extended
to nonmember trading partners. In this case, imports increase from all sources, including that of
nonmember trading partners. Furthermore, when a country gains access to the markets of existing
GATT/WTO members with the newly acquired membership, it may increase imports of inputs
necessary for the production of exports to these destinations. Some of these additional imports
may fall on third nonmember countries. For example, with the accession into WTO, China may
increase imports of oil from Iran in its expansion of production and export activities. The figures
in Table 3 suggest that the one-in effect on the treated is overall positive; the estimates range
from 39% (= e0.326 − 1) to 115% (= e0.767 − 1). These one-in effects are smaller than the both-in
13
effects, but are positive and significant. Thus, the trade-creating effects when one country in a
dyad unilaterally joins the GATT/WTO dominate the potential trade-diverting effects.
Relative to the GATT/WTO membership, a preferential GSP scheme is also found to promote
bilateral trade, by a factor of 94% (= e0.665 − 1) to 134% (= e0.851 − 1) [the upper bound estimate
is very close to Rose’s (2004) benchmark estimate 136% (= e0.86 − 1)]. The GSP effect estimates
are smaller than the both-in effects and larger than the one-in effects in general. The finding of
this ranking of the three treatment effects seems reasonable. Since the GSP is of unilateral trade
preferences extended only from a high-income country to its poor trading partners, its likely effect
on bilateral trade volumes is a priori smaller than if both the rich and the poor countries in a
dyad lower their import restrictions against each other, which happens presumably if both join
the GATT/WTO. On the other hand, any trade-promoting effect of the one-in membership is, as
argued above, indirect and conditional on the spillover of the MFN treatment and on the dyad’s
initial trade pattern, while the effect of GSP is directly derived from a straightforward reduction of
dyad-specific trade resistance. As we shall see, this ranking (both-in effect > GSP effect > one-in
effect) holds in general regardless of refinements to the matching procedure or variations in the data
used (although the one-in effect is sometimes larger than the GSP effect). Note the relatively large
range of both-in effect estimates across calipers, in contrast with the relatively narrow range of
GSP effect estimates. Among others, this may reflect heterogeneous both-in effects across trading
relationships as discussed above.
It may be also helpful to point out that the positive and stronger trade effect of both-in is
shared by a larger number of bilateral trading relationships (114, 750) than that of GSP (54, 285).
Thus, either on the average or in the aggregate, our estimation results suggest that the realized
trade-creating effect of GATT/WTO membership is larger than GSP.
For the GSP effect, we did not report the effect on the untreated, as the GSP does not apply
to all kinds of trading relationships. For example, it is not relevant to propose a GSP arrangement
between two poor countries. On the other hand, the estimates of the GSP effect on the treated
reported above in Table 3 should be taken with a grain of salt, as the conditioning set of covariates
do not control for the development stages of the two countries in a dyad. The existence of a GSP
arrangement between a dyad and their bilateral trade volumes are both very likely dependent on
their relative development stage, which implies potential selection biases. We shall see a refinement
to the matching procedure in Section 5.1 to address this concern.
5. ROBUSTNESS CHECK
5.1 Restricted Matching
In this section, we refine the baseline matching procedure to address some potential sources of
selection biases that may still remain with x controlled. Although we did the Rosenbaum (2002)
analysis to assess the sensitivity of the benchmark results to whatever selection bias may remain,
the analysis itself does not remove the bias. In the literature, four potential sources of biases
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seem to be of major concern. They are systematic unobservable heterogeneity across dyads, across
years, across GATT/WTO negotiating rounds, and across developing and developed countries.
We restrict the potential match for a subject to observations that have the opposite treatment
status (as in the case of unrestricted matching) and that are also from the same dyad, the same
year, the same time period defined according to GATT/WTO negotiating rounds, and the same
combination of relative development stage, respectively. By restricting the potential match to the
observations of the specified criterion (say, the same dyad), we remove the likely bias arising from
systematic unobservable differences (say, across dyads) that influence bilateral trade volumes as
well as selection into GATT/WTO or GSP.
5.1.1 Same Dyad. Table 5 summarizes the restricted matching results based on the Rose
(2004) data set. Extended results for each set of restricted matching not reported here (such as the
point effect estimate and CI based on the R-statistic) are available upon request. The number of
matched pairs obtained when matching is restricted within the same dyad shrinks substantially for
both-in (19,760 vs 9,510) and one-in treatments (23,463 vs 15,182), as some dyads may not have both
treated and untreated observations during the sampling years. For example, the ‘US-Japan’ dyad
have ‘one-in’ (years 1950–1954) and ‘both-in’ (years 1955–1999) observations but do not have ‘none-
in’ observations. In cases like this, dyads without qualified control/treated subjects are dropped
from the estimation. While the ‘within-dyad’ estimates suggest overall smaller treatment effects
on the treated, the trade-enhancing both-in effect continues to be economically and statistically
significant, and larger than either the one-in or GSP effect. The estimates of the both-in effect
on the treated range from 114% (= e0.760 − 1) to 156% (= e0.941 − 1), those of the one-in effect
on the treated range from 37% (= e0.314 − 1) to 59% (= e0.464 − 1), and those for GSP from 31%
(= e0.271 − 1, in this case, smaller than the one-in effect) to 64% (= e0.492 − 1).
5.1.2 Same Year. Alternatively, we restrict matching to observations from the same year;
this controls for possible year-specific effects. The ‘within-year’ results are almost the same as the
benchmark results. This indicates that in unrestricted matching, the matched subjects are often
from the same year; thus, the estimates in Table 3 pick up mostly cross-sectional variations. This
is not surprising, as the set of covariates x in unrestricted matching include year dummies, which
encourages matching observations from the same year. A further look into the data (not shown
in the table) at every five-year interval (1950, 1955, . . . , 1995) shows that the positive both-in or
one-in effect is not lumpy in a few particular years but is felt throughout the years, except in 1975
and 1995 when there is a dip in the membership effects. On the other hand, the GSP effect is low
in 1970 (its early phase) and 1995. The same pattern is observed as the Tomz et al. (2007) data
set is used, cf. Section 5.2.
In contrast with the ‘within-year’ estimates that measure cross-sectional (or ‘between’) vari-
ations, the ‘within-dyad’ estimates measure time-series (or ‘within’) variations. Both ‘within’
and ‘between’ variations indicate that there are significant gains in trade volumes by joining the
GATT/WTO, although the ‘within’ effects are overall smaller than the ‘between’ effects. This seems
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at odd with the results in Rose (2004), where he finds stronger effects with fixed-effect estimation
(which reflects ‘within’ variations in a panel framework) than with OLS estimation (which reflects
both ‘within’ and ‘between’ variations). We shall see that this relative ranking is not universal and
changes as the Tomz et al. (2007) data set is used.
The difference between the ‘within’ and ‘between’ effects may reflect different theoretical effects
along the time-series and cross-sectional dimensions. Alternatively, theoretical effects may be the
same along these two dimensions, but empirical factors as discussed earlier obscure the theoretical
effect to different extents in these two dimensions. For example, if the phenomenon of liberalizations
prior to or later than the date of accession is prevalent, the ‘within’ estimates of the theoretical
both-in effect based on the date of accession will be biased downward. The earlier the advance or
the longer the phase-in period, the stronger the downward bias of the ‘within’ effect estimate. On
the other hand, the ‘between’ estimates of the both-in effect based on formal membership are likely
affected by the other problems. For example, comparison of two developing member countries that
do not make significant trade liberalizations with two other comparable nonmember developing
countries implies a zero both-in effect. The stronger the presence of these dyads, the smaller the
‘between’ estimate of the overall both-in effect. A priori, it is difficult to say which of the two effect
estimates – ‘within’ or ‘between’ – is likely to be larger or smaller. It is also understandable that
the ranking of the two effect estimates can reverse with a different definition of involvement in the
GATT/WTO, if that changes the date of associated treatment and the status of treatment for a
significant number of observations.
5.1.3 Same GATT/WTO Round. Define periods according to the GATT/WTO trade ne-
gotiations rounds: 1948 (Before Annecy round), 1949-1951 (Annecy to Torquay round), 1952-1956
(Torquay to Geneva round), 1957-1961 (Geneva to Dillon round), 1962-1967 (Dillon to Kennedy
round), 1968-1979 (Kennedy to Tokyo round), 1980-1994 (Tokyo to Uruguay round), and 1995-
(After Uruguay round). By restricting matching to observations from the same period, the ‘within-
period’ estimates are almost the same as in unrestricted matching. This is no surprise, given our
finding above that matched subjects in unrestricted matching often come from the same year; the
criterion of matching within the same period does not impose extra restriction in most cases.
5.1.4 Same Development Stage Combination. The last column ‘within-devel.’ shows
results when matching is restricted to the same development stage combination, where the combi-
nations are: low-income/low-income, low-income/middle-income, low-income/high-income, middle-
income/middle-income, middle-income/high-income, and high-income/high-income dyads. The ar-
gument for conducting this restricted matching is that a dyad of developed countries are likely to
have a trade structure systematically different from a dyad of developed/developing countries (e.g.
intra-industry trade versus inter-industry trade) and are not comparable in terms of their poten-
tial trade volumes with or without the membership. At the same time, the probabilities of being
in the GATT/WTO may vary systematically across development stages. In this case, matching
within the same development stage combination removes this source of potential bias. Similar (or
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stronger) critique applies to estimating the GSP treatment effect, given that the decision to use
GSP is directly dependent on a dyad’s relative development stage. As the set of covariates in this
exercise also include year dummies, we compare the results with the benchmark or ‘within-year’
estimates. The ‘within-devel.’ effects on the treated are smaller overall, although the relative rank-
ing remains the same (both-in effect > GSP effect > one-in effect). The current estimates suggest
that membership raises bilateral trade by 48% (= e0.393 − 1) to 208% (= e1.124 − 1) for dyads that
both chose to be in the GATT/WTO, and by 27% (= e0.242 − 1) to 92% (= e0.650 − 1) for dyads
where only one country chose to be in the GATT/WTO. In comparison, the GSP is estimated to
raise bilateral trade by 51% (= e0.410 − 1) to 108% (= e0.732 − 1).
Are the positive membership effects shared evenly among countries of different development
stages, or are they concentrated on particular subsets of countries? A further look into the data (not
reported in the table) shows that the positive effects are indeed concentrated on dyads of middle-
income/middle-income, middle-income/high-income, and high-income/high-income countries. The
low-income countries do not benefit much from a membership in the GATT/WTO. Similar lumpy
patterns were found in Subramanian and Wei (2007), although we still find a positive average effect
while they found no positive average effect. This asymmetry may reflect the two empirical concerns
that major export sectors (e.g. agriculture) of low-income countries still face steep protectionism
from the rich world with or without the GATT/WTO and that the low-income countries themselves
do not significantly liberalize their import sectors despite their membership in the GATT/WTO.
Interestingly, the GSP effect also shows some lumpy patterns, where the positive effect is mostly
driven by dyads that involve a high-income country. Similar observations apply when the Tomz
et al. (2007) data set is used.
How robust are the restricted matching effect estimates? As the matching criterion becomes
more stringent so that potential sources of selection biases are minimized, one may accept a lower
critical threshold for Γ∗ than in unrestricted matching, as the remaining possibility of selection
bias is lower. Both ‘within-dyad’ and ‘within-devel.’ matching impose effective constraints relative
to the benchmark. In the latter case, positive treatment effects on the treated are less robust
in general than the benchmark. The tolerance threshold (Γ∗) for positive selection now stands
at 1.256, 1.197, and 1.530 for the lower bound estimates of the both-in, one-in, and GSP effect,
respectively. The GSP estimate seems rather robust in this matching exercise, when matching
within the same relative development stage is argued above to be a desirable restriction for the
GSP effect estimation. Thus, we regard this set of GSP estimates as preferred ones. Similar
conclusions are reached when the Tomz et al. (2007) data set is used instead.
In contrast, the robustness of the ‘within-dyad’ estimates of membership effects on the treated
strengthens (Γ∗ = 2.503 at the minimum for the both-in effect, and Γ∗ = 1.508 at the minimum for
the one-in effect). Thus, it is relatively comfortable for us to accept the ‘within’ estimates of the
both-in and one-in effects, as the tolerance level for hidden selection biases is higher despite the
fact that the possibility of remaining selection biases is lower with the extra matching criterion.
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5.2 Participation instead of Formal Membership
Tomz et al. (2007) stress the importance of de facto participation in the multilateral system by
nonmembers such as colonies, newly independent colonies, and provisional members. They share
to a large extent the same set of rights and obligations under the agreement as formal members.
Tomz et al. (2007) classify these territories as nonmember participants and define participation to
include both formal membership and nonmember participation. Without changing the estimation
framework of Rose (2004), they find significant participation effects on trade.
We verify if the alternative definition of GATT/WTO involvement changes our conclusions using
matching. Table 6 summarizes the results. When the GSP effect is estimated, the participation
status of a dyad, instead of their membership status, is used as part of the covariates. Thus,
the GSP effect estimates are not exactly the same as those based on the Rose (2004) data set.
Tomz et al. (2007) also corrected some coding errors in Rose’s data set, in particular, the income
status and geography indicator of some territories (Tomz et al., 2007, Foonote 32). This explains
the difference in the number of matched pairs obtained for GSP under ‘within-devel.’ with the
alternative data set.
Table 6 indicates that participation effects are overall stronger than membership effects. Both
the ‘between’ estimates (‘unrestricted’, ‘within-year’, ‘within-period’) and the ‘within’ estimates
(‘within-dyad’) are larger than corresponding estimates based on Rose’s data set. They are also
more robust to hidden selection biases. In particular, the ‘within’ estimates are so much larger that
they are now larger than the ‘between’ estimates (cf. Section 5.1). The exception to this pattern –
stronger participation effects than membership effects – occurs when matching is restricted within
the same relative development stage. In contrast, the estimates of the GSP effect are overall
smaller when matching is based on the Tomz et al. (2007) data set than on the Rose (2004) data
set, regardless of the matching criteria. However, the difference is not large. This is understandable
given that the change in the GATT/WTO indicator from membership to participation affects the
GSP estimates only indirectly through conditioning covariates that include many other variables.
In all, the current finding of an overall larger participation effect than the membership effect is
consistent with the contrasting results found by Tomz et al. (2007) and by Rose (2004).
5.3 Kernel-Weighting Matching
In this section, we verify the robustness of the point effect estimates to kernel-weighting match-
ing using the Rose (2004) data set. In contrast with pair matching which uses only the nearest
match, kernel-weighting matching uses multiple potential matches with weights attached defined by
the chosen kernel and bandwidth. In particular, we use the normal kernel and define weights for the
potential matches i′t′ of a treated (untreated) subject it as wit,i′t′ ≡ φ(x1,it−x1,i′t′SD(x1)h ) . . . φ(
xP,it−xP,i′t′
SD(xP )h
)
where φ(·) denotes the standard normal density function, P the dimension of the covariate vector x,
SD(xp) the standard deviation of a covariate xp in the pooled sample, and h the chosen bandwidth.
For matching within dyad where the number Nit of potential comparison subjects for a subject it
is small, we use a larger bandwidth h = 0.5N−1/(P+4)it ; otherwise, we use a smaller bandwidth
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h = 0.25N−1/(P+4)it (the computation hits numerical bounds for smaller bandwidths than this).
The kernel-weighting matching estimator is then defined as 1M
∑
it(yit −
∑
i′t′ w˜it,i′t′yi′t′), where
w˜it,i′t′ ≡ wit,i′t′/
∑
i′t′ wit,i′t′ is the normalized weight. We set calipers in the same fashion as in pair
matching, such that subject it that does not have a good match in terms of the scale-normalized
distance is discarded. Table 7 summarizes the results. The effect estimates are very similar to those
obtained by pair matching, cf. Tables 3 and 5, across types of treatments, calipers, and the match-
ing criteria. We also experiment with larger bandwidths. As the chosen bandwidth is enlarged,
the point effect estimates tend to increase. Thus, we may consider the pair matching estimates as
overall conservative estimates.
5.4 Non-random Incidence of Positive Trade Flows
By using the data set of Rose (2004) or Tomz et al. (2007), we have based our analysis on
observations with positive trade flows. Recent studies of Helpman et al. (2008) and Felbermayr
and Kohler (2007) emphasize the importance of incorporating observations with zero trade flows
in estimating the gravity equation. In particular, both studies find that GATT/WTO membership
has a positive effect on the formation of bilateral trading relationships. This suggests that using
only observations with positive trade flows will induce a downward bias in the effect estimate of
GATT/WTO membership (and other trade barriers in general) on trade volumes, since a dyad
who are not GATT/WTO members but still observed trading with each other are likely to have
lower unobserved trade resistance. Both studies find that consideration of this selection bias alone
indeed strengthens the gravity equation estimates albeit not considerably.2
Given that we found a strong and positive membership effect based on positive trade flows,
the above selection argument suggests that incorporating observations with zero trade flows in
our analysis will only strengthen the initial finding of a positive effect. Thus, we do not expect
our general conclusions to change with the inclusion of zero trade. Both studies by Helpman
et al. (2008) and Felbermayr and Kohler (2007) are based on parametric estimations of the trade
flow equation, although the former considers parametric as well as nonparametric estimations of the
selection equation. To estimate the membership effect and also to address the selection into positive
trade flows in a fully nonparametric framework, one can potentially apply the newly proposed
methodology of Lee (2008). We leave this considerably more extensive work for future research,
and attempt a less ambitious approach here to isolating the GATT/WTO membership effect on
trade volumes from its effect on ‘trade start’ without resorting to a new data set and a full-blown
new estimation framework.
Still based on the Rose (2004) data set, we use only observations where a dyad start trading
with each other before joining the GATT/WTO. In other words, these dyads have reported bilateral
2Helpman et al. (2008) also distinguish the direct partial effect of trade resistance on trade flows from its indirect
effect on trade flows through changes in the number of exporters. In this paper, we have not made this distinction.
In our view, the larger trade flows due to an increase in the number of exporters should also be considered as part of
the benefit of GATT/WTO membership. Thus, the matching estimates presented correspond to the total effect of
GATT/WTO membership, including both the direct and indirect effects.
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trade flows before either one country of them ever joins the GATT/WTO. Using this sub-sample
of observations that trade with or without the GATT/WTO membership, the membership effect
on prompting new trading relationships is not present; thus, the effect estimates consist only of the
GATT/WTO membership’s effect on trade volumes. Table 8 presents the effect estimates for this
sub-sample following the same matching procedure as in the benchmark and restricted matchings.
We see that this refined analysis reports overall stronger membership effects, and thus in a way the
results are consistent with the above selection argument.
5.5 Multilateral Resistance
Relative trade resistance rather than absolute trade resistance is argued by some gravity the-
ories to be more appropriate in explaining bilateral trade flows, cf. Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), and multilateral resistance (MR) terms may have to be included in the list of covariates. As
their paper suggested, there are two ways to control for the terms. One is to solve the endogenous
MR terms given the parameter values and then to estimate the parametric gravity equation incor-
porating dyads’ MR terms by nonlinear least squares. Both the solution to the endogenous MR
terms and the parametric gravity equation rely on certain functional form assumptions and thus
are subject to specification errors as noted by the authors themselves, which are exactly what we
try to avoid in the current paper by using the matching framework. An alternative suggested by
the same authors is to replace the MR terms with country dummies. In a way, we have controlled
for dyad-specific and hence country-specific effects when we conduct the matching within the same
dyad; the strong effects of GATT/WTO remained. On the other hand, we do not have a good way
in the matching framework to control for time-varying country-specific effects as emphasized by
some parametric studies, cf. Subramanian and Wei (2007).
Recent studies by Baier and Bergstrand (2009a,b) present some potential methods to approxi-
mate the endogenous MR terms by observable exogenous trade resistance covariates and thus the
possibilities to address time-varying MR terms in the matching framework. Specifically, in one
version of their proposed approximations, the two country-specific MR terms for a dyad are de-
composed into a list of MR terms associated with each trade resistance covariate. For example,
the MR term for a trade resistance covariate xrkmt between countries k and m in year t, would
beMRxrkmt = (1/N)
∑N
m′=1 x
r
km′t+(1/N)
∑N
k′=1 x
r
k′mt− (1/N2)
∑N
k′=1
∑N
m′=1 x
r
k′m′t, reflecting the
respective average trade resistance of the two countries to all their trading partners, adjusted by a
typical country’s average resistance to all its trading partners. One can add this list of MR terms to
the list of covariates already used in the matching.3 Specifically, to estimate the both-in treatment
effect, we follow the same matching procedure as in the benchmark case but with the modified list
of matching covariates that include the same economic size covariates (lrgdp, lrgdppc, lareap), the
trade resistance covariates (ldist, comlang, . . ., regional, gsp) and their corresponding MR terms,
3Alternatively, one can construct the relative trade resistance covariate BV xrkmt ≡ xrkmt −MRxrkmt and use it in
place of the absolute trade resistance covariate xrkmt in the matching, as done in Baier and Bergstrand (2009b). We
take the former approach, as it imposes less structure.
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year dummies, and the MR term of the treatment dummy.4 Similar adjustments are made to the
list of matching covariates for one-in and GSP effect estimations. The results are summarized in
Table 9.
When the multilateral resistance terms are controlled for, we see that the strong both-in effects
on the treated remain; at the same time, the both-in effects on the untreated strengthen and
become more similar in magnitude to those on the treated. Overall, the both-in treatment effect
is economically and statistically significant. Based on the lower bound estimate, a treated dyad’s
bilateral trade flows are higher by 144% (= e0.894 − 1) than comparable untreated dyads. The
one-in treatment effects now become weaker overall with statistically significant but small trade
promoting effects.
The results are almost identical when the matching is restricted within the same year or the
same period, reflecting again the fact that in the unrestricted matching, most matched observations
are cross sections from the same year. When matching is restricted within the same dyad, the both-
in and one-in effects are comparable to those in Table 5 without the MR terms controlled for. This
suggests that the MR terms do not vary much across years for the same dyad, and hence the extra
control does not affect the matching significantly. The trade creating effect is 133% (= e0.845 − 1)
with both countries in the GATT/WTO, and 45% (= e0.371 − 1) with only one country in the
GATT/WTO, based on the lower bound estimates for the effect on the treated. When matching
is restricted within the same relative development stage, the both-in effects are also stronger with
the MR terms controlled for, with the lower bound estimate suggesting a trade promoting effect of
77% (= e0.569− 1). The mean both-in effect again masks a large variation across dyads of different
development stages (not reported in the table), with large benefits tending to concentrate on higher
income dyads and costs on lower income dyads. The one-in effects are again weaker with the MR
terms controlled for, with either economically small or statistically insignificant effects.
The GSP treatment effects are stronger with the MR terms controlled for as in the case of
both-in effects, and show a pattern of weaker results when matching is restricted within the same
dyad. In the preferred case for the GSP estimation where matching is restricted within the same
relative development stage, the lower bound estimate suggests a trade promoting effect of 104%
(= e0.712 − 1).
5.6 Difference in Difference Matching Estimator
In this section, we explore an alternative treatment effect concept, difference-in-difference (DD),
that is based on weaker identification assumptions. This method compares the difference over time
in trade volumes of a treated dyad to that of a comparable untreated dyad. Consider a time period
[t − b, t + a] around the treatment timing t with a, b > 0. Using our notations, the DD treatment
4Note that we have included the MR term of bothin in the list of matching covariates in estimating the both-in
treatment effect; thus, the estimated both-in effect corresponds to its partial equilibrium effect and not its potential
general equilibrium effect (the estimation of which goes against the typical assumption of matching estimation). In
the context of free trade agreements (FTAs) that Baier and Bergstrand (2009b) studied, they argued that the effect
of the MR term of the treatment dummy, FTA, was conceptually negligible.
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effect estimand is:
DD = E(yt+a − yt−b|d = 1, x)−E(yt+a − yt−b|d = 0, x)
= E(y1t+a − y0t−b|d = 1, x)−E(y0t+a − y0t−b|d = 0, x)
= E(y1t+a − y0t+a|d = 1, x) (5)
if the same time-effect condition E(y0t+a − y0t−b|d = 1, x) = E(y0t+a − y0t−b|d = 0, x) holds. That is,
DD identifies the treatment effect on the treated at time t + a if the potential untreated response
changes by the same magnitude on average over the time period [t−b, t+a] for comparable treated
and untreated dyads. This identifying assumption is weaker than E(y0|d = 1, x) = E(y0|d = 0, x)
required for the effect on the treated in the benchmark analysis, cf. Section 2.1, and thus is more
robust to hidden biases due to selection on unobservables. For example, the same time-effect
condition allows potential systematic unobserved dyadic heterogeneities across the treatment and
control group or systematic time trends in trade volumes unrelated to the treatment, as long as
the time trends are on average the same for comparable dyads. See Heckman et al. (1997) for DD
estimation based on matching, and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and references therein for other
DD approaches.
To estimate DD, we carry out matching in a similar fashion as described in Section 2.1. In
particular, start with a both-in treated dyad. If the dyad was first treated in year t, the pool of
potential matches for this dyad are dyads who were both not in the GATT/WTO throughout the
period [t− b, t+ a]. The best match is identified based on the baseline response and the covariates
in the pre-treatment year (yt−b, xt−b). The same scale-normalized distance measure is used, with
the sample variance of (yt−b, xt−b) calculated based on all observations in year t − b. Given the
match, the difference over time in trade flows (y0t+a − y0t−b) of the control dyad is subtracted from
the difference over time (y1t+a−y0t−b) of the treated dyad. GivenM pairs of match, DD is estimated
by the sample average of the pair-wise differences in differences. The one-in and GSP treatment
analysis can be carried out similarly. Note that we have included the baseline response yt−b in the
list of matching covariates. This is to control for potential unobservables that may systematically
affect trade flows but are not captured by the observables xt−b, and thus to reduce the scope of
selection on unobservables.
Some remarks are in order. First, selecting the lead and lag years (a, b) is difficult. One guideline
is whether the same time effect condition will hold given the choice of (a, b). As noted earlier, policy
changes do not necessarily coincide with the official year of GATT/WTO accession. Some countries
may undertake structural changes required for the accession beforehand or economic agents may
act on anticipation of the upcoming accession. Thus, trade flows may well have changed before the
official accession of the treated dyad, and to satisfy the same time effect condition, a large b may
be required. On the other hand, it is quite often true that acceding countries take several years
to phase in the agreed-upon trade policy changes, and thus one may expect the treatment effect
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to manifest itself only years later. A large a may address this concern. However, choosing too
large a window (a, b) may pose two problems: first, the sample size will be significantly reduced
as not all dyads have observations in long extended periods; second, with a long window, other
factors not controlled for (by the same time effect condition and the matching covariates) may
affect the trade flows and contaminate the result. We experiment with several symmetric windows:
a = b = {1, 2, . . . , 6}. Another remark worth noting is that a dyad typically went from a none-in
period to a one-in period and then to a both-in period, if they were ever both-in treated. It is
relatively rare for a dyad to simultaneously join the GATT/WTO and to go directly from none-in
to both-in. To maintain reasonable sample sizes, we allow both scenarios of pre-treatment status
(none-in or one-in) in estimating the both-in treatment effect. Thus, the both-in effect estimate is
a mixture of the two effects when the dyad go from one-in to both-in and when the dyad go from
none-in to both-in, relative to if they stay none-in throughout the interval. The one-in and GSP
effect analysis are spared such complication.
The findings are summarized in Figure 2. The results are similar across different caliper choices.
In general, the GATT/WTO membership effects are negligible in early phases of the treatment but
become statistically and economically significant five or six years into the treatment. At year six, an
average dyad’s bilateral trade flows increase roughly by 65% (= e0.5−1). Similar patterns apply to
the both-in or one-in treatment. In contrast, the GSP effect is small if not negligible and manifests
itself relatively fast following the treatment. The effect remains relatively stable throughout the
years, and is statistically insignificant in most cases.
These findings seem to agree with the casual observations and our discussions above regarding
the gradual phase-in of policy changes after an official GATT/WTO accession. It may also be
reconcilable with the larger benchmark and restricted matching estimates discussed in Tables 3
and 5. In these earlier exercises, we did not control for the vintage of the treated observations;
thus, the treatment effect estimate effectively summarizes the effects across all vintages following
the treatment for as far as several decades. If the effect is larger, the more aged the treatment is,
a larger effect estimate observed in the previous exercises is understandable.
5.6.1 Placebo Exercise. In this section, we conduct “placebo” exercises to verify that the
time trends of trade flows of matched dyads are comparable in advance of membership. A finding
against differences in pre-trends would help alleviate concerns that the DD estimates may be
picking up systematic differences in time trends between the treatment and control group due to
unobservables not controlled for in our matching exercise. To do so, we apply the DD estimation
procedure to a bogus treatment year t′ = t − d that predates the actual year of treatment t (here
identified as the first year when either one country in a treated dyad joins the GATT/WTO).
As there is no treatment at the bogus treatment year, the DD estimate, instead of estimating
the treatment effect, captures the difference in the time trends between comparable treated and
untreated dyads in advance of GATT/WTO membership.
As discussed above, countries may undertake policy reforms in advance of membership, and
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their trade patterns may well have changed years before the official year of accession. Thus, the
period of comparison of the pre-trends has to be set reasonably far into the past, such that it does
not overlap with the likely period of transition to the accession. For this, we experiment with
d = {7, . . . , 12} and symmetric DD windows a = b = {1, . . . , 6}, with d − a ≥ 6. That is, the
period of comparison of the pre-trends will be at least six years before the actual year of treatment.
For example, if the bogus treatment year is set 10 years before the actual treatment year, the
forward/backward window for DD estimation can range from one to four years.
The results are summarized in Table 10. As can be seen from the table, of the 21 possible
periods of comparison (and of the four caliper scenarios for each period), all estimates are not
significantly different from zeros, except three estimates that are significantly negative (which does
not go against a finding of positive treatment effects). Thus, on the whole, there is no evidence
of systematic differences in the time trends in advance of membership between the treatment and
control group that are comparable in terms of observables.
6. WHAT COULD BE THE PROBLEMS WITH THE PARAMETRIC
GRAVITY ESTIMATES
The results above suggest that the conventional gravity models may be misspecified. In this
section, we explore generalizing the parametric gravity model to reduce the discrepancy between
the conventional OLS gravity estimates and the current nonparametric matching estimates. Our
investigation points to one possible explanation: omission of relevant interaction terms. Interaction
terms present two problems in the parametric framework. First, there can be too many when there
are many covariates. Second, if the treatment interacts with some covariates as often happens in
practice, this makes the effect heterogeneous and difficult to present. This is where nonparametric
methods come particularly useful: nonparametric methods deliver findings without the need to
search for the correct specification.
We first explore adding quadratic terms of continuous/categorical covariates and interactions of
these covariates with all other binary covariates (other than the treatment dummies themselves),
to the Rose (2004) default gravity specification. Many of these terms are significant, but the OLS
estimates of the membership effects are not affected significantly.
While our matching estimator allows for heterogeneous treatment effects that vary with the
observed covariates, the Rose (2004) gravity estimates basically assume homogeneous treatment
effects. Subramanian and Wei (2007) allow for heterogeneous effects in the parametric framework
but only across certain subsets of samples. To allow for more arbitrary forms of heterogeneous
effects in the parametric framework, we explore adding interaction terms of the treatment dummies
with all other covariates to the Rose (2004) default specification. The results are summarized in
Table 11. When only the bothin treatment dummy is allowed to interact with the other covariates,
the general finding does not change, although many of the interaction terms are significant. As
both the bothin and onein dummies are allowed to interact with the other covariates, the mean
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effects of both membership treatments become significantly positive. Many of the interaction
terms are statistically significant, and the default model is rejected in favor of the alternative
model. While the estimates for the main gravity covariates (such as distance and GDP) remain
stable across specifications, estimates for the other covariates are not, suggesting that the modeling
of these augmenting covariates (typically used to control for the degree of trade resistance) is
problematic. Basically, parametric effect estimates of these augmenting trade resistance covariates
are very sensitive to the model specifications. This may help explain some of the disagreements in
the gravity literature regarding the currency union effect (Persson, 2001; Rose, 2001) or the free
trade agreement effect (Frankel, 1997; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).
As the gsp dummy is also allowed to interact with the other covariates, the mean effect estimates
of the both-in and one-in membership remain significantly positive. The GSP mean effect estimate
is, however, rather similar to its marginal effect estimate in the default specification. This suggests
that allowing for heterogeneous GSP effects helps increasing the explanatory power of the model
but the degree of heterogeneity is not strong, compared with the both-in and one-in effects. This
also agrees with the findings of the matching framework above: while the GSP effect estimates are
relatively stable across the choice of calipers, the both-in and one-in effect estimates vary a lot,
and while the GSP effect estimates are relatively similar across the parametric and nonparametric
approaches, the membership effect estimates are very different across the two approaches.
Based on the results in the last column of Table 11, it appears that the both-in and one-in
membership effects are intensified by GDP’s per capita and the physical areas of the dyad, and
are also intensified if the dyad share a common language, were ever in a colonial relationship, or
belong to a common currency union. Overall, the explorations above suggest that it is important
in practice to recognize the potential nonlinearity in which trade resistance covariates interact with
each other in affecting bilateral trade flows.
In the Rose (2004) default specification, the MR terms are not controlled for. We also explored
controlling for the MR terms before proceeding with the same experiment as above of adding higher-
order or interaction terms. In particular, we follow Subramanian and Wei (2007) and use time-
varying country dummies to proxy for the MR terms in the Rose (2004) parametric framework.5
The findings are similar to those above without the MR terms controlled for. The both-in and
one-in effect estimates are not statistically significant by controlling for the MR terms alone. By
incorporating the interaction terms of the membership dummies with the other covariates, the
effects turn significantly positive. The set of statistically significant interaction terms are similar:
e.g., GDP’s per capita, a common language, and being ever in a colonial relationship tend to
strengthen the membership effects.
In the current application, we stop short of fully explaining away the discrepancy between the
5Instead of using the complete Rose (2004) data set, only observations at every five years between 1950 and 1995 are
used. This is to keep the number of time-varying country dummies computationally manageable; see Subramanian
and Wei (2007) for the same approach. Five variables—lrgdp, lrgdppc, landl, island, lareap—are dropped from
the list of regressors, as their coefficients cannot be precisely estimated with the presence of time-varying country
dummies; their higher-order terms or interaction terms with the other covariates can still be included, however.
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effect estimates of the parametric and nonparametric approaches, as the dimension of the covariate
vector is high and there are many potential functional forms of the covariates. For example, the
treatment dummies may also interact with the interaction terms of the other covariates. Nonethe-
less, our limited search suggests that the assumption of homogeneous treatment effects could be a
major source of misspecification. The nonparametric framework we propose in this paper offers a
convenient estimation framework to accommodate heterogeneous treatment effects and at the same
time circumvents the specification difficulty in a high-dimensional application.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper contributes to the literature on the effects of GATT/WTOmembership/participation
on actual trade flows. Previous studies of this issue have largely relied on parametric gravity-based
trade models. Concerns about parametric misspecifications, the assumption of homogeneous treat-
ment effects and unobserved selection bias are raised by the current paper and addressed by using
nonparametric methods. In particular, pair-matching estimator is used to obtain the point effect
estimates, permutation tests to derive the inferences, and a sensitivity analysis based on signed-rank
tests to evaluate the robustness of the baseline results to unobserved confounders. The last two
methods are relatively new in econometrics. We put together these statistical tools in a coherent
manner so that they could be easily applied to other treatment effect problems of similar nature.
Our findings suggest that membership in the GATT/WTO has a significant trade-promoting
effect for dyads that have both chosen to be members. The effect is larger than bilateral trade
preference arrangements, GSP, and larger than when only one country in a dyad is a member.
Although the GSP effect appears to be relatively constant across subjects, the both-in and one-in
effects display substantial heterogeneities. The finding of a positive both-in effect is quite robust
to potential unobserved confounders but the finding of a positive one-in effect is less robust.
The overall conclusion does not change when we restrict the matching to observations from the
same dyad (thus, capturing the within effect), the same year (thus, capturing the between effect),
the same GATT/WTO period, or the same relative development stage. The overall conclusion does
not change either when we use participation status instead of formal membership as the treatment
indicator, or when we use kernel-weighting matching instead of pair-matching. The results are
also robust to using only observations where a dyad’s trading relationship exists before either
one country of them ever joins the GATT/WTO (thus, isolating the membership’s effect on trade
volumes from its effect on the formation of trading relationships), and robust to controlling for time-
varying multilateral resistance terms in the matching framework. A final robustness check using the
difference-in-difference matching estimator reveals that the significant and positive GATT/WTO
effect on trade takes several years after the official accession before manifesting itself.
The contrast between the results of the current paper and of Rose (2004) suggests that con-
ventional gravity models may be misspecified. We show that the omission of interaction terms
between membership dummies and functions of the other covariates from the gravity model may
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be the major source of misspecification. The nonparametric framework we propose in this paper
offers a convenient estimation framework to accommodate heterogeneous treatment effects and at
the same time circumvents the specification difficulty in a high-dimensional application.
8. APPENDIX: PERMUTATION TEST FOR MATCHED PAIRS
Recall thatD′ ≡ 1M
∑M
m=1wmsm(ym1−ym2), where only the permutation variable wm is random
with P (wm = 1) = P (wm = −1) = 0.5, conditional on the observed data. Hence, E(D′) = 0 and
V (D′) = E(D′2) = 1
M2
∑M
m=1E{w2ms2m(ym1 − ym2)2} = 1M2
∑M
m=1(ym1 − ym2)2. By applying the
central limit theorem to wm’s, the exact p-value of D can be approximated by
P (D′ ≥ D) = P
{
D′
{∑Mm=1(ym1 − ym2)2/M2}1/2 ≥ D{∑Mm=1(ym1 − ym2)2/M2}1/2
}
' P
{
N(0, 1) ≥ D{∑Mm=1(ym1 − ym2)2/M2}1/2
}
.
We can obtain the CI for the mean effect by inverting the above test procedure. For instance,
suppose that the treatment effect is βm for pair m. Define the mean effect β¯ ≡ 1M
∑M
m=1 βm. In
this case, the no-effect situation is restored by replacing ym1 with ym1 − βm when sm = 1 or ym2
with ym2 − βm when sm = −1:
Dβ¯ ≡
1
M
M∑
m=1
sm(ym1 − smβm − ym2) = 1
M
M∑
m=1
sm(ym1 − ym2)− 1
M
M∑
m=1
βm
=
1
M
M∑
m=1
sm(ym1 − ym2)− β¯,
and the permutation test can be applied. Define accordingly D′¯
β
≡ 1M
∑M
m=1wm[sm(ym1−ym2)− β¯]
to observe E(D′¯
β
) = 0 and V (D′¯
β
) = 1
M2
∑M
m=1[sm(ym1 − ym2) − β¯]2. Now conduct level-α tests
with
Dβ¯
{∑Mm=1[sm(ym1 − ym2)− β¯]2/M2}1/2 . (6)
The collection of β¯ values that are not rejected using (6) is the (1−α)100% CI for β¯. In the above
framework, we have generalized the procedure to allow for heterogeneous treatment effects, and as
such, the CI constructed is for the mean effect β¯. Clearly, this framework includes homogeneous
treatment effects as a special case when βm = β for all m.
9. APPENDIX: SIGNED-RANK TEST FOR MATCHED PAIRS
The permuted versionR′ forR can be written asR′ ≡∑Mm=1 rm1[wmsm > 0] =∑Mm=1 rm(1[wm =
1, sm = 1] + 1[wm = −1, sm = −1]). Note that rm’s and sm’s are fixed conditional on the data and
the only thing random is the permutation variable wm. Thus, under the H0 of exchangeability,
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E(R′) =
∑M
m=1 rm/2 =M(M + 1)/4, and V (R
′) =
∑M
m=1 r
2
m/4 =M(M + 1)(2M + 1)/24. Hence,
when M is large, the normally approximated p-value for R is
P
{
N(0, 1) ≥ R − M(M + 1)/4{M(M + 1)(2M + 1)/24}1/2
}
.
Under the assumption of homogeneous treatment effects, the CI for the effect can be obtained
by inverting the signed-rank test procedure. Conduct level-α tests with different values of β using
Rβ − M(M + 1)/4
{M(M + 1)(2M + 1)/24}1/2 , where Rβ ≡
M∑
m=1
rmβ1[sm(ym1 − smβ − ym2) > 0] (7)
and rmβ is the rank of |ym1 − smβ − ym2|, m = 1, ...,M . The collection of β values that are not
rejected is the (1 − α)100% CI for β. To obtain a point estimate of the treatment effect, we can
use the Hodges and Lehmann (1963) estimator, which is the solution of β such that
Rβ =
M(M + 1)
4
{= E(R′)}. (8)
Note that when treatment effects are heterogeneous, the pair-wise effect βm (instead of β) should
be subtracted from each pair-wise difference in (7), but in Rβ we cannot pull out the pair-wise
effects βm, m = 1, 2, . . . ,M , and summarize them by a single number as in Dβ¯. Thus, one cannot
generalize (7) and (8) to the case of heterogeneous treatment effects.
10. APPENDIX: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Given p+ ≡ Γ1+Γ ≥ 0.5 and p− ≡ 11+Γ ≤ 0.5, define R+ (R−) as the sum ofM -many independent
random variables where the mth variable takes the value rm with probability p+ (p−) and 0 with
probability 1− p+ (1− p−). Writing R+ as∑Mm=1 rmum, where P (um = 1) = p+ and P (um = 0) =
1− p+, we get
E(R+) =
M∑
m=1
rmE(um) = p+
M∑
m=1
rm =
p+M(M + 1)
2
,
V (R+) =
M∑
m=1
r2mV (um) = p
+(1− p+)
M∑
m=1
r2m =
p+(1− p+)M(M + 1)(2M + 1)
6
.
Doing analogously, we obtain
E(R−) =
p−M(M + 1)
2
and V (R−) =
p−(1− p−)M(M + 1)(2M + 1)
6
.
It follows from Rosenbaum (2002, Proposition 13) that P (R+ ≥ a) ≥ P (R′ ≥ a) ≥ P (R− ≥ a) for
arbitrary a.
For treatment effect analysis with matching, various sensitivity analyses have appeared in the
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statistics literature as reviewed in Rosenbaum (2002), but not many in econometrics. Those that
have appeared in the econometrics literature include the parametric/structural regression approach
of Imbens (2003) and Altonji et al. (2005). This approach allows for an unobserved confounder to
affect both treatment and response, but is heavily dependent on the parametric assumptions about
the structural equations of treatment and response.
Ichino et al. (2008) suggested an alternative, simulation-based, approach of sensitivity analysis
for matching estimators. This approach also allows for an unobserved confounder to affect both
treatment and response, but without relying on any parametric/structural model for the treat-
ment and response. The unobserved confounder is simulated and included in the list of matching
covariates to evaluate the sensitivity of point effect estimates. This is feasible only for binary unob-
served confounders in the context of binary treatment/response variables, so that the distribution
of the unobserved confounder can be characterized by four probability parameters conditional on
the treatment/response outcomes.
Gastwirth et al. (1998) extended the Rosenbaum (2002) approach by allowing the unobserved
confounder to affect both treatment and response. The approach of Gastwirth et al. (1998) is,
however, parametric/structural; it specifies exactly how the unobserved confounder appears in the
treatment and response equation. For instance, in the case where both the treatment and response
variables are binary, the logit form is obtained, which may not look so objectionable; in other
cases, the parametric specification becomes too restrictive. In a sense, the benefit of considering
how the unobserved confounder affects the response is obtained at this parametrization cost. Refer
to Lee et al. (2007) and Lee and Lee (2009) for applications of this approach. Since a hidden bias
results from unobserved confounders affecting both treatment and response, the Rosenbaum (2002)
analysis is conservative in the sense that it may be concerned with a hidden bias that does not
exist at all if the unobserved confounder does not affect the response. Thus, if we find a result to
be robust using the Rosenbaum (2002) approach, its robustness using the Gastwirth et al. (1998)
approach is implied. Refer also to Lee (2004) for a nonparametric reduced-form sensitivity analysis.
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Table 1: Rose (2004) data set – descriptive statistics
variables Both in One in None in (control group)
mean SD 25% 75% mean SD 25% 75% mean SD 25% 75%
ltrade 10.472 3.415 8.344 12.815 9.759 3.253 8.013 11.937 9.246 2.964 8.062 11.124
ldist 8.198 0.797 7.843 8.745 8.188 0.772 7.751 8.749 7.873 0.972 7.216 8.685
lrgdp 48.404 2.681 46.615 50.218 47.582 2.526 45.930 49.265 46.432 2.582 44.968 48.068
lrgdppc 16.234 1.579 15.242 17.358 15.940 1.394 15.036 16.902 15.386 1.344 14.508 16.249
comlang 0.238 0.426 0 0 0.187 0.390 0 0 0.304 0.460 0 1
border 0.027 0.162 0 0 0.026 0.160 0 0 0.072 0.258 0 0
landl 0.251 0.471 0 0 0.241 0.461 0 0 0.246 0.467 0 0
island 0.364 0.548 0 1 0.331 0.535 0 1 0.264 0.503 0 0
lareap 24.145 3.230 22.445 26.314 24.270 3.293 22.466 26.588 24.238 3.480 22.362 26.739
comcol 0.105 0.307 0 0 0.089 0.285 0 0 0.124 0.330 0 0
curcol 0.004 0.062 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.017 0 0
colony 0.027 0.162 0 0 0.016 0.126 0 0 0.008 0.092 0 0
comctry 0.001 0.024 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
custrict 0.019 0.136 0 0 0.009 0.093 0 0 0.014 0.117 0 0
regional 0.018 0.134 0 0 0.009 0.096 0 0 0.019 0.138 0 0
gsp 0.299 0.458 0 1 0.201 0.400 0 0 0.008 0.090 0 0
year 1984.1 11.5 1976 1994 1978.9 12.4 1970 1989 1973.6 12.7 1963 1983
obs. 114,750 98,810 21,037
Table 2: Rose (2004) data set – selection on observables
variables Both in One in
odds p-value 95% CI odds p-value 95% CI
ldist 1.174 0.000 1.147 1.202 1.230 0.000 1.203 1.257
lrgdp 1.538 0.000 1.521 1.555 1.222 0.000 1.209 1.235
lrgdppc 0.892 0.000 0.878 0.906 0.999 0.907 0.984 1.014
comlang 0.767 0.000 0.735 0.801 0.714 0.000 0.686 0.743
border 0.870 0.002 0.795 0.951 0.848 0.000 0.783 0.918
landl 1.187 0.000 1.142 1.233 1.072 0.000 1.034 1.112
island 1.872 0.000 1.793 1.955 1.448 0.000 1.391 1.508
lareap 0.875 0.000 0.867 0.882 0.947 0.000 0.940 0.955
comcol 1.645 0.000 1.546 1.750 1.293 0.000 1.223 1.368
curcol 12.385 0.000 5.320 28.834 1.678 0.000 1.417 1.988
colony 2.126 0.000 1.775 2.547 — — — —
comctry — — — — — — — —
custrict 6.961 0.000 6.031 8.034 1.705 0.000 1.467 1.981
regional 0.762 0.000 0.666 0.873 0.879 0.070 0.764 1.011
gsp 27.698 0.000 23.750 32.303 19.230 0.000 16.487 22.428
obs. 135,720 119,841
Note: The results are based on logistic regressions with nonein = 1 observations as the control
group. The odds estimates are equal to exponential transformation of coefficient estimates in
logit regressions. All regressions include year dummies. In the both-in regression, comctry
is dropped as comctry = 1 predicts bothin = 1 perfectly. In the one-in regression, curcol
is dropped as curcol = 1 predicts onein = 0 perfectly and comctry is dropped because of
collinearity.
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Figure 1: Support of covariates for treatment and control group
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Table 3: Rose (2004) data set – unrestricted matching
permutation test signed-rank test sensitivity analysis
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) one-sided test two-sided test
caliper effect p-value 95% CI effect p-value 95% CI Γ∗ as in Γ∗ as in
Both in GATT/WTO treatment effect
on the treated (M1 = 114, 750):
100% 1.328 0.000 [1.307, 1.349] 1.332 0.000 [1.312, 1.351] 2.434 R+ 2.428 R+
80% 1.075 0.000 [1.052, 1.098] 1.075 0.000 [1.053, 1.096] 2.086 R+ 2.081 R+
60% 0.836 0.000 [0.810, 0.862] 0.835 0.000 [0.810, 0.859] 1.780 R+ 1.775 R+
40% 0.553 0.000 [0.522, 0.584] 0.535 0.000 [0.507, 0.563] 1.472 R+ 1.467 R+
on the untreated (M0 = 21, 037):
100% 0.337 0.000 [0.296, 0.379] 0.303 0.000 [0.266, 0.342] 1.250 R+ 1.243 R+
80% 0.239 0.000 [0.192, 0.286] 0.200 0.000 [0.157, 0.241] 1.144 R+ 1.138 R+
60% 0.185 0.000 [0.131, 0.239] 0.138 0.000 [0.090, 0.187] 1.084 R+ 1.077 R+
40% 0.304 0.000 [0.239, 0.368] 0.243 0.000 [0.184, 0.301] 1.177 R+ 1.167 R+
on all (M1 +M0 = 135, 787):
100% 1.175 0.000 [1.156, 1.193] 1.161 0.000 [1.143, 1.179] 2.209 R+ 2.205 R+
80% 0.899 0.000 [0.878, 0.919] 0.883 0.000 [0.863, 0.902] 1.858 R+ 1.854 R+
60% 0.636 0.000 [0.613, 0.659] 0.619 0.000 [0.597, 0.640] 1.559 R+ 1.555 R+
40% 0.428 0.000 [0.400, 0.455] 0.399 0.000 [0.374, 0.424] 1.342 R+ 1.338 R+
One in GATT/WTO treatment effect
on the treated (M1 = 98, 810):
100% 0.767 0.000 [0.746, 0.789] 0.773 0.000 [0.753, 0.792] 1.759 R+ 1.755 R+
80% 0.564 0.000 [0.540, 0.588] 0.568 0.000 [0.547, 0.589] 1.525 R+ 1.521 R+
60% 0.422 0.000 [0.396, 0.449] 0.428 0.000 [0.405, 0.451] 1.397 R+ 1.393 R+
40% 0.326 0.000 [0.296, 0.357] 0.325 0.000 [0.298, 0.351] 1.294 R+ 1.289 R+
on the untreated (M0 = 21, 037):
100% 0.030 0.068 [-0.009, 0.069] 0.034 0.022 [0.000, 0.068] 1.006 R+ 1.001 R+
80% 0.092 0.000 [0.048, 0.135] 0.089 0.000 [0.052, 0.126] 1.057 R+ 1.051 R+
60% 0.078 0.001 [0.028, 0.129] 0.084 0.000 [0.041, 0.127] 1.046 R+ 1.039 R+
40% 0.138 0.000 [0.076, 0.201] 0.149 0.000 [0.096, 0.203] 1.102 R+ 1.094 R+
on all (M1 +M0 = 119, 847):
100% 0.638 0.000 [0.619, 0.657] 0.632 0.000 [0.615, 0.649] 1.610 R+ 1.607 R+
80% 0.443 0.000 [0.422, 0.464] 0.437 0.000 [0.418, 0.455] 1.401 R+ 1.397 R+
60% 0.324 0.000 [0.301, 0.347] 0.321 0.000 [0.301, 0.340] 1.297 R+ 1.293 R+
40% 0.225 0.000 [0.198, 0.253] 0.220 0.000 [0.197, 0.243] 1.194 R+ 1.190 R+
GSP treatment effect
on the treated (M1 = 54, 285):
100% 0.851 0.000 [0.831, 0.871] 0.792 0.000 [0.774, 0.811] 2.277 R+ 2.269 R+
80% 0.757 0.000 [0.736, 0.778] 0.696 0.000 [0.676, 0.716] 2.125 R+ 2.117 R+
60% 0.693 0.000 [0.668, 0.717] 0.627 0.000 [0.604, 0.649] 1.998 R+ 1.990 R+
40% 0.665 0.000 [0.635, 0.696] 0.581 0.000 [0.553, 0.608] 1.879 R+ 1.869 R+
Note:
1. The pool of potential matches for an observation are restricted to observations with the opposite treatment status; no further
restriction is imposed. The number of matched pairs for the effect on the treated (untreated) is indicated by M1 (M0).
2. The caliper is set such that only the best 100%, 80%, 60%, or 40% of matched pairs obtained are included in the analysis.
For example, with the caliper choice of 60%, the matched pairs with the quadratic distance exceeding the upper 60 percentile
of all matched pairs obtained are discarded.
3. In ‘permutation test’, the results are based on the D-statistic.
4. In ‘signed-rank test’, the results are based on the R-statistic.
5. We carried out both simulation and normal approximation approaches for calculating the p-values and the CI’s, and found
almost identical results (which is expected given that the sample size is large). Thus, we report only the results based on normal
approximation.
6. In ‘sensitivity analysis’, the sensitivity analysis is conducted for the significance (p-value) of the signed-rank R-statistic based
on the critical level α = 0.05 in a one-sided or two-sided test. R+ or R− (as a function of the odds ratio Γ) indicates the
relevant distribution in calculating the critical bound Γ∗ at which the conclusion of the signed-rank test reverses.
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Table 4: Rose (2004) data set – means of covariates for removed dyads with tighter calipers
covariates treated subjects untreated subjects
[c100t, c80t] [c80t, c60t] [c60t, c40t] [c40t, c0t] [c100c, c80c] [c80c, c60c] [c60c, c40c] [c40c, c0c]
Both in vs. None in
ldist 8.056 8.257 8.138 8.269 7.121 7.769 7.882 8.298
lrgdp 49.030 48.648 48.361 47.990 44.489 45.946 46.714 47.505
lrgdppc 17.010 16.519 16.351 15.645 15.120 15.536 15.417 15.429
comlang 0.501 0.246 0.249 0.097 0.557 0.428 0.295 0.120
border 0.076 0.021 0.019 0.009 0.212 0.082 0.047 0.009
landl 0.352 0.314 0.236 0.176 0.370 0.307 0.264 0.144
island 0.547 0.469 0.361 0.222 0.489 0.301 0.200 0.165
lareap 23.548 24.028 23.720 24.714 22.150 23.678 24.665 25.348
comcol 0.187 0.130 0.148 0.031 0.354 0.147 0.076 0.022
curcol 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
colony 0.129 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.018 0.015 0.006 0.001
comctry 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
custrict 0.084 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.063 0.001 0.001 0.002
regional 0.085 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.087 0.008 0.002 0.000
gsp 0.576 0.573 0.186 0.080 0.000 0.001 0.009 0.015
year 1987.8 1984.8 1984.2 1981.8 1969.1 1972.8 1974.4 1975.8
One in vs. None in
ldist 8.192 8.113 8.120 8.258 7.245 7.677 7.929 8.258
lrgdp 47.894 47.301 47.498 47.609 44.660 46.049 46.752 47.349
lrgdppc 16.721 16.052 15.858 15.534 15.210 15.430 15.443 15.424
comlang 0.294 0.268 0.163 0.106 0.556 0.420 0.268 0.138
border 0.052 0.042 0.016 0.011 0.222 0.086 0.023 0.014
landl 0.327 0.305 0.214 0.179 0.367 0.294 0.242 0.163
island 0.517 0.510 0.311 0.159 0.482 0.317 0.223 0.149
lareap 23.717 23.480 24.168 24.993 22.511 23.851 24.599 25.114
comcol 0.129 0.195 0.067 0.027 0.387 0.115 0.064 0.027
curcol 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
colony 0.074 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.027 0.012 0.000 0.001
comctry 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
custrict 0.038 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.054 0.004 0.008 0.002
regional 0.030 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.047 0.032 0.011 0.004
gsp 0.712 0.139 0.088 0.032 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.018
year 1981.9 1980.8 1979.1 1976.3 1973.2 1972.2 1973.2 1974.6
Note: The symbol c#t denotes the #% caliper of the treated subjects, and c#c the #% caliper of the untreated subjects.
For example, in the column [c100t, c80t], ldist has mean 8.056, which is the mean for the dyads that are removed when the
caliper tightens from 100% to 80% for the effect on the treated. In the column [c100c, c80c], the same interpretation holds
except that the estimated effect is the effect on the untreated. Parallel interpretations apply to the other specified ranges.
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Table 5: Rose (2004) data set – restricted matching effect estimates and sensitivity
within dyad within year within period within devel.
caliper effect Γ∗ effect Γ∗ effect Γ∗ effect Γ∗
Both in GATT/WTO treatment effect
on the treated:
M1 19,760 114,750 114,750 112,959
100% 0.941∗∗∗ 3.170 1.329∗∗∗ 2.427 1.331∗∗∗ 2.432 1.124∗∗∗ 2.019
80% 0.760∗∗∗ 2.543 1.075∗∗∗ 2.081 1.075∗∗∗ 2.081 0.778∗∗∗ 1.601
60% 0.833∗∗∗ 2.771 0.836∗∗∗ 1.775 0.836∗∗∗ 1.775 0.541∗∗∗ 1.385
40% 0.796∗∗∗ 2.503 0.553∗∗∗ 1.467 0.553∗∗∗ 1.467 0.393∗∗∗ 1.256
on the untreated:
M0 9,510 21,037 21,037 21,013
100% 1.300∗∗∗ 4.129 0.340∗∗∗ 1.245 0.340∗∗∗ 1.245 0.309∗∗∗ 1.216
80% 1.117∗∗∗ 3.440 0.239∗∗∗ 1.138 0.239∗∗∗ 1.138 0.175∗∗∗ 1.077
60% 0.989∗∗∗ 2.983 0.185∗∗∗ 1.077 0.185∗∗∗ 1.077 0.101∗∗∗ 1.009
40% 0.847∗∗∗ 2.600 0.304∗∗∗ 1.167 0.304∗∗∗ 1.167 0.077∗∗,b 1.019−
on all:
M1 +M0 29,270 135,787 135,787 133,972
100% 1.058∗∗∗ 3.496 1.176∗∗∗ 2.205 1.177∗∗∗ 2.208 0.997∗∗∗ 1.880
80% 0.895∗∗∗ 2.911 0.899∗∗∗ 1.854 0.899∗∗∗ 1.854 0.662∗∗∗ 1.504
60% 0.935∗∗∗ 3.002 0.636∗∗∗ 1.555 0.636∗∗∗ 1.555 0.442∗∗∗ 1.309
40% 0.873∗∗∗ 2.679 0.428∗∗∗ 1.338 0.428∗∗∗ 1.338 0.247∗∗∗ 1.143
One in GATT/WTO treatment effect
on the treated:
M1 23,463 98,810 98,810 98,363
100% 0.464∗∗∗ 1.931 0.761∗∗∗ 1.747 0.762∗∗∗ 1.749 0.650∗∗∗ 1.552
80% 0.403∗∗∗ 1.772 0.564∗∗∗ 1.521 0.564∗∗∗ 1.521 0.476∗∗∗ 1.391
60% 0.371∗∗∗ 1.656 0.422∗∗∗ 1.393 0.422∗∗∗ 1.393 0.342∗∗∗ 1.263
40% 0.314∗∗∗ 1.508 0.326∗∗∗ 1.289 0.326∗∗∗ 1.289 0.242∗∗∗ 1.197
on the untreated:
M0 15,182 21,037 21,037 21,013
100% 0.579∗∗∗ 2.097 0.032a 1.004 0.032a 1.004 0.049∗∗ 1.001
80% 0.463∗∗∗ 1.805 0.092∗∗∗ 1.051 0.092∗∗∗ 1.051 0.063∗∗∗ 1.014
60% 0.386∗∗∗ 1.597 0.078∗∗∗ 1.039 0.078∗∗∗ 1.039 0.034 1.013−
40% 0.317∗∗∗ 1.465 0.138∗∗∗ 1.094 0.138∗∗∗ 1.094 0.062∗∗,c 1.004−
on all:
M1 +M0 38,645 119,847 119,847 119,376
100% 0.509∗∗∗ 2.016 0.633∗∗∗ 1.601 0.634∗∗∗ 1.603 0.544∗∗∗ 1.452
80% 0.428∗∗∗ 1.808 0.443∗∗∗ 1.397 0.443∗∗∗ 1.397 0.391∗∗∗ 1.316
60% 0.403∗∗∗ 1.698 0.324∗∗∗ 1.293 0.324∗∗∗ 1.293 0.215∗∗∗ 1.161
40% 0.291∗∗∗ 1.460 0.225∗∗∗ 1.190 0.225∗∗∗ 1.190 0.175∗∗∗ 1.137
GSP treatment effect
on the treated:
M1 52,025 54,285 54,285 53,811
100% 0.487∗∗∗ 2.570 0.850∗∗∗ 2.267 0.851∗∗∗ 2.269 0.732∗∗∗ 2.011
80% 0.492∗∗∗ 2.494 0.757∗∗∗ 2.117 0.757∗∗∗ 2.117 0.588∗∗∗ 1.807
60% 0.379∗∗∗ 1.937 0.693∗∗∗ 1.990 0.693∗∗∗ 1.990 0.507∗∗∗ 1.699
40% 0.271∗∗∗ 1.528 0.665∗∗∗ 1.869 0.665∗∗∗ 1.869 0.410∗∗∗ 1.530
Note:
The effect estimate refers to the D-statistic. All significance levels refer to a two-sided test. The
effect estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% significance level if indicated by a superscript
of ∗∗∗, ∗∗, or ∗, respectively. The sensitivity parameter Γ∗ is based on a two-sided test at the 5%
significance level. The distribution used in calculating the critical bound Γ∗ is R+ unless a superscript
− is indicated following the bound Γ∗, in which case, R− is used. Other than those indicated below,
the significance level of the D-statistic agrees with that of the R-statistic.
a. The D-statistic is not significant at the 10% level, but the R-statistic is significant at the 5% level.
b. The D-statistic is significant at the 5% level, but the R-statistic is not significant.
c. The D-statistic is significant at the 5% level, but the R-statistic is only significant at the 10% level.
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Table 6: Tomz et al. (2007) data set – matching effect estimates and sensitivity
unrestricted within dyad within year within period within devel.
caliper effect Γ∗ effect Γ∗ effect Γ∗ effect Γ∗ effect Γ∗
Both participating in GATT/WTO treatment effect
on the treated:
M1 152,986 8,005 152,986 152,986 152,986
100% 1.418∗∗∗ 2.426 1.554∗∗∗ 7.535 1.427∗∗∗ 2.439 1.426∗∗∗ 2.438 1.065∗∗∗ 2.099
80% 1.260∗∗∗ 2.284 1.513∗∗∗ 6.689 1.260∗∗∗ 2.284 1.260∗∗∗ 2.284 0.710∗∗∗ 1.626
60% 1.089∗∗∗ 2.058 1.285∗∗∗ 4.969 1.089∗∗∗ 2.058 1.089∗∗∗ 2.058 0.515∗∗∗ 1.382
40% 0.762∗∗∗ 1.706 1.361∗∗∗ 5.134 0.762∗∗∗ 1.706 0.762∗∗∗ 1.706 0.461∗∗∗ 1.324
on the untreated:
M0 9,703 4,144 9,703 9,703 9,703
100% 0.396∗∗∗ 1.341 1.743∗∗∗ 8.186 0.396∗∗∗ 1.341 0.396∗∗∗ 1.341 0.164∗∗∗ 1.092
80% 0.343∗∗∗ 1.280 1.561∗∗∗ 6.518 0.343∗∗∗ 1.280 0.343∗∗∗ 1.280 0.169∗∗∗ 1.093
60% 0.361∗∗∗ 1.275 1.334∗∗∗ 4.927 0.361∗∗∗ 1.275 0.361∗∗∗ 1.275 0.168∗∗∗ 1.079
40% 0.404∗∗∗ 1.301 1.060∗∗∗ 3.527 0.404∗∗∗ 1.301 0.404∗∗∗ 1.301 0.200∗∗∗ 1.075
on all:
M1 +M0 162,689 12,149 162,689 162,689 162,689
100% 1.357∗∗∗ 2.351 1.618∗∗∗ 7.950 1.365∗∗∗ 2.363 1.365∗∗∗ 2.362 1.012∗∗∗ 2.028
80% 1.184∗∗∗ 2.189 1.536∗∗∗ 6.684 1.184∗∗∗ 2.189 1.184∗∗∗ 2.189 0.656∗∗∗ 1.571
60% 1.002∗∗∗ 1.956 1.417∗∗∗ 5.872 1.002∗∗∗ 1.956 1.002∗∗∗ 1.956 0.467∗∗∗ 1.341
40% 0.666∗∗∗ 1.618 1.315∗∗∗ 4.992 0.666∗∗∗ 1.618 0.666∗∗∗ 1.618 0.402∗∗∗ 1.284
One participating in GATT/WTO treatment effect
on the treated:
M1 71,908 11,637 71,908 71,908 71,908
100% 0.818∗∗∗ 1.777 0.852∗∗∗ 2.877 0.822∗∗∗ 1.782 0.820∗∗∗ 1.778 0.464∗∗∗ 1.457
80% 0.631∗∗∗ 1.580 0.716∗∗∗ 2.393 0.631∗∗∗ 1.580 0.631∗∗∗ 1.580 0.278∗∗∗ 1.244
60% 0.444∗∗∗ 1.423 0.738∗∗∗ 2.279 0.444∗∗∗ 1.423 0.444∗∗∗ 1.423 0.290∗∗∗ 1.241
40% 0.304∗∗∗ 1.295 0.546∗∗∗ 1.840 0.304∗∗∗ 1.295 0.304∗∗∗ 1.295 0.172∗∗∗ 1.154
on the untreated:
M0 9,703 6,548 9,703 9,703 9,703
100% -0.040 1.033− 0.754∗∗∗ 2.384 -0.040 1.033− -0.040 1.033− 0.089∗∗∗ 1.044
80% 0.006 1.025− 0.633∗∗∗ 1.993 0.006 1.025− 0.006 1.025− 0.099∗∗∗ 1.032
60% 0.028a 1.005− 0.473∗∗∗ 1.604 0.028a 1.005− 0.028a 1.005− 0.028 1.040−
40% 0.135∗∗∗ 1.097 0.396∗∗∗ 1.456 0.135∗∗∗ 1.097 0.135∗∗∗ 1.097 0.103∗∗ 1.010
on all:
M1 +M0 81,611 18,185 81,611 81,611 81,611
100% 0.716∗∗∗ 1.668 0.817∗∗∗ 2.725 0.720∗∗∗ 1.672 0.718∗∗∗ 1.669 0.420∗∗∗ 1.412
80% 0.523∗∗∗ 1.484 0.719∗∗∗ 2.370 0.523∗∗∗ 1.484 0.523∗∗∗ 1.484 0.242∗∗∗ 1.213
60% 0.349∗∗∗ 1.335 0.643∗∗∗ 2.059 0.349∗∗∗ 1.335 0.349∗∗∗ 1.335 0.238∗∗∗ 1.209
40% 0.206∗∗∗ 1.192 0.411∗∗∗ 1.565 0.206∗∗∗ 1.192 0.206∗∗∗ 1.192 0.172∗∗∗ 1.152
GSP treatment effect
on the treated:
M1 54,285 52,025 54,285 54,285 54,285
100% 0.824∗∗∗ 2.243 0.485∗∗∗ 2.561 0.823∗∗∗ 2.241 0.824∗∗∗ 2.243 0.688∗∗∗ 1.959
80% 0.726∗∗∗ 2.065 0.480∗∗∗ 2.407 0.726∗∗∗ 2.065 0.726∗∗∗ 2.065 0.569∗∗∗ 1.786
60% 0.667∗∗∗ 1.944 0.375∗∗∗ 1.893 0.667∗∗∗ 1.944 0.667∗∗∗ 1.944 0.489∗∗∗ 1.679
40% 0.621∗∗∗ 1.782 0.265∗∗∗ 1.494 0.621∗∗∗ 1.782 0.621∗∗∗ 1.782 0.401∗∗∗ 1.510
Note: The general notes for Table 5 apply to the current table.
a. The D-statistic is not significant at the 10% level, but the R-statistic is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 7: Rose (2004) data set – kernel-weighting matching effect estimates
caliper unrestricted within dyad within year within period within devel.
Both in GATT/WTO treatment effect
on the treated:
100% 1.323 0.929 1.284 1.321 0.962
80% 1.078 0.764 1.076 1.079 0.778
60% 0.840 0.835 0.837 0.841 0.542
40% 0.558 0.799 0.554 0.559 0.396
on the untreated:
100% 0.323 1.282 0.317 0.324 0.308
80% 0.249 1.105 0.243 0.250 0.179
60% 0.200 0.977 0.193 0.202 0.105
40% 0.303 0.835 0.300 0.304 0.081
on all:
100% 1.168 1.046 1.131 1.166 0.856
80% 0.902 0.892 0.899 0.903 0.663
60% 0.641 0.932 0.637 0.642 0.444
40% 0.434 0.868 0.429 0.435 0.251
One in GATT/WTO treatment effect
on the treated:
100% 0.753 0.484 0.748 0.753 0.604
80% 0.573 0.423 0.571 0.574 0.483
60% 0.436 0.393 0.433 0.436 0.353
40% 0.344 0.342 0.341 0.344 0.260
on the untreated:
100% 0.037 0.555 0.023 0.038 0.058
80% 0.101 0.439 0.093 0.103 0.068
60% 0.094 0.358 0.083 0.096 0.047
40% 0.131 0.285 0.124 0.133 0.065
on all:
100% 0.626 0.512 0.619 0.626 0.505
80% 0.452 0.431 0.449 0.452 0.398
60% 0.337 0.404 0.333 0.338 0.226
40% 0.243 0.295 0.238 0.244 0.188
GSP treatment effect
on the treated:
100% 0.874 0.491 0.863 0.875 0.744
80% 0.786 0.497 0.773 0.788 0.605
60% 0.731 0.384 0.712 0.733 0.544
40% 0.709 0.277 0.688 0.711 0.456
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Table 8: Rose (2004) data set – trading relationship exists before GATT/WTO membership
unrestricted within dyad within year within period within devel.
caliper effect Γ∗ effect Γ∗ effect Γ∗ effect Γ∗ effect Γ∗
Both in GATT/WTO treatment effect
on the treated:
M1 19,760 19,760 19,760 19,760 19,522
100% 1.599∗∗∗ 2.983 1.032∗∗∗ 3.372 1.606∗∗∗ 2.983 1.607∗∗∗ 2.989 1.302∗∗∗ 2.364
80% 1.447∗∗∗ 2.660 0.836∗∗∗ 2.726 1.447∗∗∗ 2.660 1.447∗∗∗ 2.660 1.157∗∗∗ 2.086
60% 1.149∗∗∗ 2.195 0.886∗∗∗ 2.885 1.149∗∗∗ 2.195 1.149∗∗∗ 2.195 0.909∗∗∗ 1.771
40% 0.861∗∗∗ 1.817 0.821∗∗∗ 2.586 0.861∗∗∗ 1.817 0.861∗∗∗ 1.817 0.639∗∗∗ 1.469
on the untreated:
M0 21,037 9,510 20,700 21,027 21,013
100% 0.891∗∗∗ 1.891 1.220∗∗∗ 3.746 0.922∗∗∗ 1.943 0.948∗∗∗ 1.990 0.604∗∗∗ 1.453
80% 0.791∗∗∗ 1.758 1.037∗∗∗ 3.075 0.788∗∗∗ 1.752 0.792∗∗∗ 1.758 0.617∗∗∗ 1.466
60% 0.675∗∗∗ 1.611 0.912∗∗∗ 2.684 0.668∗∗∗ 1.598 0.675∗∗∗ 1.611 0.523∗∗∗ 1.364
40% 0.639∗∗∗ 1.526 0.754∗∗∗ 2.280 0.637∗∗∗ 1.520 0.639∗∗∗ 1.526 0.446∗∗∗ 1.295
on all:
M1 +M0 40,797 29,270 40,460 40,787 40,535
100% 1.234∗∗∗ 2.387 1.093∗∗∗ 3.531 1.256∗∗∗ 2.426 1.267∗∗∗ 2.454 0.940∗∗∗ 1.859
80% 1.048∗∗∗ 2.092 0.938∗∗∗ 2.991 1.041∗∗∗ 2.080 1.048∗∗∗ 2.092 0.825∗∗∗ 1.703
60% 0.846∗∗∗ 1.834 0.919∗∗∗ 2.899 0.843∗∗∗ 1.828 0.846∗∗∗ 1.834 0.625∗∗∗ 1.479
40% 0.705∗∗∗ 1.636 0.848∗∗∗ 2.574 0.705∗∗∗ 1.635 0.705∗∗∗ 1.636 0.503∗∗∗ 1.371
One in GATT/WTO treatment effect
on the treated:
M1 23,463 23,463 23,463 23,463 23,384
100% 0.986∗∗∗ 2.060 0.469∗∗∗ 1.935 0.985∗∗∗ 2.058 0.985∗∗∗ 2.059 0.903∗∗∗ 1.879
80% 0.758∗∗∗ 1.743 0.392∗∗∗ 1.753 0.758∗∗∗ 1.743 0.758∗∗∗ 1.743 0.691∗∗∗ 1.609
60% 0.615∗∗∗ 1.590 0.351∗∗∗ 1.653 0.615∗∗∗ 1.590 0.615∗∗∗ 1.590 0.492∗∗∗ 1.384
40% 0.535∗∗∗ 1.491 0.354∗∗∗ 1.621 0.535∗∗∗ 1.491 0.535∗∗∗ 1.491 0.415∗∗∗ 1.320
on the untreated:
M0 21,037 15,182 21,027 21,027 21,013
100% 0.457∗∗∗ 1.378 0.562∗∗∗ 2.054 0.463∗∗∗ 1.389 0.461∗∗∗ 1.385 0.311∗∗∗ 1.205
80% 0.523∗∗∗ 1.479 0.459∗∗∗ 1.788 0.523∗∗∗ 1.479 0.523∗∗∗ 1.479 0.415∗∗∗ 1.311
60% 0.438∗∗∗ 1.397 0.478∗∗∗ 1.856 0.438∗∗∗ 1.398 0.438∗∗∗ 1.398 0.347∗∗∗ 1.246
40% 0.473∗∗∗ 1.450 0.395∗∗∗ 1.651 0.474∗∗∗ 1.451 0.474∗∗∗ 1.451 0.380∗∗∗ 1.314
on all:
M1 +M0 44,500 38,645 44,490 44,490 44,397
100% 0.736∗∗∗ 1.726 0.505∗∗∗ 2.001 0.738∗∗∗ 1.731 0.738∗∗∗ 1.729 0.623∗∗∗ 1.543
80% 0.623∗∗∗ 1.612 0.419∗∗∗ 1.788 0.623∗∗∗ 1.611 0.623∗∗∗ 1.611 0.552∗∗∗ 1.471
60% 0.522∗∗∗ 1.505 0.407∗∗∗ 1.761 0.521∗∗∗ 1.504 0.521∗∗∗ 1.504 0.411∗∗∗ 1.317
40% 0.493∗∗∗ 1.478 0.387∗∗∗ 1.691 0.493∗∗∗ 1.478 0.493∗∗∗ 1.478 0.399∗∗∗ 1.334
Note: The general notes for Table 5 apply to the current table.
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Table 9: Rose (2004) data set – with multilateral resistance terms
unrestricted within dyad within year within period within devel.
caliper effect Γ∗ effect Γ∗ effect Γ∗ effect Γ∗ effect Γ∗
Both in GATT/WTO treatment effect
on the treated:
M1 114,750 19,760 114,750 114,750 112,959
100% 1.622∗∗∗ 2.616 0.942∗∗∗ 3.170 1.618∗∗∗ 2.605 1.620∗∗∗ 2.609 1.243∗∗∗ 2.041
80% 1.355∗∗∗ 2.273 0.778∗∗∗ 2.594 1.355∗∗∗ 2.273 1.355∗∗∗ 2.273 0.750∗∗∗ 1.543
60% 1.130∗∗∗ 2.023 0.850∗∗∗ 2.858 1.130∗∗∗ 2.023 1.130∗∗∗ 2.023 0.659∗∗∗ 1.452
40% 0.894∗∗∗ 1.798 0.845∗∗∗ 2.624 0.894∗∗∗ 1.798 0.894∗∗∗ 1.798 0.569∗∗∗ 1.375
on the untreated:
M0 21,037 9,510 21,037 21,037 21,013
100% 0.838∗∗∗ 1.850 1.276∗∗∗ 4.089 0.851∗∗∗ 1.866 0.842∗∗∗ 1.854 0.541∗∗∗ 1.454
80% 0.773∗∗∗ 1.749 1.112∗∗∗ 3.457 0.773∗∗∗ 1.749 0.773∗∗∗ 1.749 0.545∗∗∗ 1.436
60% 0.695∗∗∗ 1.696 0.985∗∗∗ 2.988 0.695∗∗∗ 1.696 0.695∗∗∗ 1.696 0.472∗∗∗ 1.357
40% 0.638∗∗∗ 1.660 0.867∗∗∗ 2.637 0.638∗∗∗ 1.660 0.638∗∗∗ 1.660 0.408∗∗∗ 1.317
on all:
M1 +M0 135,787 29,270 135,787 135,787 133,972
100% 1.500∗∗∗ 2.496 1.051∗∗∗ 3.484 1.499∗∗∗ 2.490 1.499∗∗∗ 2.491 1.133∗∗∗ 1.949
80% 1.236∗∗∗ 2.170 0.897∗∗∗ 2.925 1.236∗∗∗ 2.170 1.236∗∗∗ 2.170 0.694∗∗∗ 1.514
60% 1.002∗∗∗ 1.919 0.949∗∗∗ 3.083 1.002∗∗∗ 1.919 1.002∗∗∗ 1.919 0.633∗∗∗ 1.456
40% 0.834∗∗∗ 1.785 0.891∗∗∗ 2.746 0.834∗∗∗ 1.785 0.834∗∗∗ 1.785 0.512∗∗∗ 1.360
One in GATT/WTO treatment effect
on the treated:
M1 98,810 23,463 98,810 98,810 98,363
100% 0.627∗∗∗ 1.560 0.454∗∗∗ 1.903 0.627∗∗∗ 1.560 0.627∗∗∗ 1.561 0.455∗∗∗ 1.385
80% 0.401∗∗∗ 1.368 0.399∗∗∗ 1.761 0.401∗∗∗ 1.368 0.401∗∗∗ 1.368 0.270∗∗∗ 1.230
60% 0.246∗∗∗ 1.242 0.371∗∗∗ 1.650 0.246∗∗∗ 1.242 0.246∗∗∗ 1.242 0.209∗∗∗ 1.194
40% 0.252∗∗∗ 1.267 0.374∗∗∗ 1.612 0.252∗∗∗ 1.267 0.252∗∗∗ 1.267 0.107∗∗∗ 1.124
on the untreated:
M0 21,037 15,182 21,037 21,037 21,013
100% 0.191∗∗∗ 1.107 0.551∗∗∗ 2.004 0.202∗∗∗ 1.118 0.195∗∗∗ 1.110 0.129∗∗∗ 1.041
80% 0.154∗∗∗ 1.096 0.443∗∗∗ 1.745 0.154∗∗∗ 1.096 0.154∗∗∗ 1.096 0.105∗∗∗ 1.040
60% 0.061∗∗∗ 1.034 0.443∗∗∗ 1.674 0.061∗∗∗ 1.034 0.061∗∗∗ 1.034 0.006 1.037−
40% 0.079∗∗∗ 1.061 0.323∗∗∗ 1.461 0.079∗∗∗ 1.061 0.079∗∗∗ 1.061 -0.034 1.024
on all:
M1 +M0 119,847 38,645 119,847 119,847 119,376
100% 0.550∗∗∗ 1.485 0.492∗∗∗ 1.962 0.552∗∗∗ 1.487 0.551∗∗∗ 1.486 0.397∗∗∗ 1.330
80% 0.331∗∗∗ 1.300 0.414∗∗∗ 1.770 0.331∗∗∗ 1.300 0.331∗∗∗ 1.300 0.247∗∗∗ 1.205
60% 0.232∗∗∗ 1.225 0.412∗∗∗ 1.709 0.232∗∗∗ 1.225 0.232∗∗∗ 1.225 0.186∗∗∗ 1.167
40% 0.208∗∗∗ 1.227 0.355∗∗∗ 1.554 0.208∗∗∗ 1.227 0.208∗∗∗ 1.227 0.072∗∗∗ 1.084
GSP treatment effect
on the treated:
M1 54,285 52,025 54,285 54,285 53,811
100% 1.044∗∗∗ 2.243 0.485∗∗∗ 2.559 1.043∗∗∗ 2.242 1.044∗∗∗ 2.244 0.954∗∗∗ 2.183
80% 1.060∗∗∗ 2.309 0.494∗∗∗ 2.624 1.060∗∗∗ 2.309 1.060∗∗∗ 2.309 0.948∗∗∗ 2.195
60% 0.954∗∗∗ 2.139 0.456∗∗∗ 2.261 0.954∗∗∗ 2.139 0.954∗∗∗ 2.139 0.762∗∗∗ 1.869
40% 0.872∗∗∗ 2.023 0.325∗∗∗ 1.679 0.872∗∗∗ 2.023 0.872∗∗∗ 2.023 0.712∗∗∗ 1.748
Note: The general notes for Table 5 apply to the current table.
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Figure 2: Difference-in-Difference matching estimates
2 4 6
0
0.5
1
10
0%
 c
al
ip
er
Both in
2 4 6
0
0.5
1
80
%
 c
al
ip
er
2 4 6
0
0.5
1
60
%
 c
al
ip
er
2 4 6
0
0.5
1
year
40
%
 c
al
ip
er
2 4 6
0
0.5
1
One in
2 4 6
0
0.5
1
2 4 6
0
0.5
1
2 4 6
0
0.5
1
year
2 4 6
0
0.5
1
GSP
2 4 6
0
0.5
1
2 4 6
0
0.5
1
2 4 6
0
0.5
1
year
Note:
a. The x-axis indicates the years of lead and lag (a, b) used in the DD estimation; here, symmetric
leads and lags are used. The y-axis (not labeled) indicates the treatment effect magnitude.
b. The solid line indicates the treatment effect point estimate. The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI
based on the permutation test.
c. The sample size (the number of qualified matched pairs) for each treatment scenario is as follows.
Both-in: 3600 (1 year), 3216 (2 years), 2955 (3 years), 2461 (4 years), 2277 (5 years), 1812 (6 years).
One-in: 1303 (1 year), 1110 (2 years), 1022 (3 years), 828 (4 years), 736 (5 years), 651 (6 years).
GSP: 2231 (1 year), 2184 (2 years), 2031 (3 years), 1976 (4 years), 1913 (5 years), 1859 (6 years).
These correspond to the sample size used in the 100% caliper choice.
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Table 10: Rose (2004) data set – placebo exercise
years before the actual treatment year
12 11 10
DD window (years) caliper effect 95% CI effect 95% CI effect 95% CI
1 100% 0.040 [-0.107, 0.187] -0.064 [-0.219, 0.090] 0.052 [-0.088, 0.192]
80% -0.003 [-0.171, 0.166] -0.118 [-0.289, 0.053] 0.037 [-0.115, 0.189]
60% -0.025 [-0.224, 0.174] -0.202 [-0.390, -0.013] 0.026 [-0.156, 0.207]
40% -0.024 [-0.243, 0.195] -0.264 [-0.498, -0.030] 0.014 [-0.209, 0.238]
2 100% -0.025 [-0.201, 0.152] 0.010 [-0.161, 0.180] -0.006 [-0.180, 0.169]
80% -0.080 [-0.282, 0.123] -0.088 [-0.283, 0.106] -0.006 [-0.202, 0.191]
60% -0.038 [-0.276, 0.199] -0.044 [-0.279, 0.191] -0.061 [-0.290, 0.167]
40% -0.054 [-0.360, 0.253] -0.050 [-0.337, 0.237] -0.065 [-0.340, 0.209]
3 100% 0.092 [-0.139, 0.324] 0.145 [-0.057, 0.346] 0.010 [-0.175, 0.196]
80% 0.196 [-0.070, 0.463] 0.181 [-0.052, 0.415] -0.044 [-0.249, 0.160]
60% 0.234 [-0.039, 0.507] 0.067 [-0.182, 0.317] -0.065 [-0.294, 0.164]
40% 0.061 [-0.261, 0.383] 0.146 [-0.148, 0.440] -0.089 [-0.353, 0.175]
4 100% 0.012 [-0.198, 0.222] -0.027 [-0.239, 0.185] -0.019 [-0.223, 0.185]
80% 0.024 [-0.208, 0.257] 0.057 [-0.196, 0.311] 0.039 [-0.190, 0.268]
60% -0.007 [-0.277, 0.263] 0.007 [-0.294, 0.308] 0.122 [-0.137, 0.382]
40% -0.007 [-0.363, 0.349] -0.062 [-0.426, 0.301] 0.164 [-0.151, 0.479]
5 100% -0.166 [-0.411, 0.079] -0.213 [-0.438, 0.012]
80% -0.116 [-0.391, 0.159] -0.240 [-0.491, 0.011]
60% -0.121 [-0.434, 0.193] -0.304 [-0.606, -0.003]
40% -0.133 [-0.508, 0.243] -0.304 [-0.658, 0.049]
6 100% -0.138 [-0.425, 0.149]
80% -0.105 [-0.430, 0.220]
60% -0.015 [-0.388, 0.357]
40% -0.230 [-0.651, 0.191]
years before the actual treatment year
9 8 7
effect 95% CI effect 95% CI effect 95% CI
1 100% 0.134 [-0.011, 0.278] -0.039 [-0.172, 0.093] 0.106 [-0.031, 0.243]
80% 0.090 [-0.065, 0.244] -0.035 [-0.169, 0.100] 0.078 [-0.069, 0.225]
60% 0.061 [-0.115, 0.238] -0.002 [-0.164, 0.160] 0.036 [-0.135, 0.206]
40% 0.116 [-0.091, 0.324] -0.011 [-0.214, 0.192] 0.021 [-0.187, 0.230]
2 100% -0.072 [-0.232, 0.089] 0.058 [-0.094, 0.209]
80% -0.072 [-0.255, 0.111] 0.058 [-0.097, 0.214]
60% -0.047 [-0.245, 0.150] -0.004 [-0.174, 0.167]
40% -0.009 [-0.264, 0.246] -0.003 [-0.213, 0.206]
3 100% -0.104 [-0.280, 0.073]
80% -0.077 [-0.271, 0.117]
60% -0.044 [-0.263, 0.175]
40% -0.084 [-0.359, 0.191]
Note:
1. The estimation proceeds as described in Section 5.6 for DD estimation, but with a bogus treatment year t′ = t − d
used, where {d = 7, . . . , 12}, which predates the actual year of treatment t (here identified as the first year when either one
country in a treated dyad joins the GATT/WTO).
2. The DD window refers to the years of lead and lag (a, b) used in the DD estimation, where it is set that a = b.
3. The effect refers to the bogus treatment effect on the treated dyad when using the bogus treatment year.
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Table 11: parametric gravity estimates with heterogeneous treatment effects
ltrade Rose default heter. both-in heter. both-in / heter. both-in /
effect one-in effect one-in / gsp effect
ldist -1.119 (0.022) -1.112 (0.028) -1.099 (0.060) -1.100 (0.060)
lrgdp 0.916 (0.010) 0.900 (0.012) 0.858 (0.027) 0.858 (0.027)
lrgdppc 0.321 (0.014) 0.246 (0.019) 0.045 (0.044) 0.044 (0.044)
comlang 0.313 (0.040) 0.259 (0.053) 0.092 (0.107) 0.091 (0.107)
border 0.526 (0.111) 0.475 (0.122) 0.560 (0.190) 0.558 (0.190)
landl -0.271 (0.031) -0.253 (0.041) -0.174 (0.086) -0.173 (0.086)
island 0.042 (0.036) 0.043 (0.048) 0.108 (0.116) 0.109 (0.116)
lareap -0.097 (0.008) -0.122 (0.010) -0.171 (0.023) -0.171 (0.023)
comcol 0.585 (0.067) 0.669 (0.084) 1.080 (0.158) 1.079 (0.158)
curcol 1.075 (0.235) 2.780 (0.356) 4.812 (0.570) 4.810 (0.570)
colony 1.164 (0.117) 1.076 (0.152) -0.526 (0.210) -0.522 (0.209)
comctry -0.016 (1.081) 0.056 (1.035) 0.047 (1.035) 0.333 (1.035)
custrict 1.118 (0.122) 0.624 (0.177) 0.038 (0.325) 0.037 (0.324)
regional 1.199 (0.106) 1.435 (0.154) 0.576 (0.392) 0.573 (0.391)
bothin -0.042 (0.053) -4.587 (0.636) -10.720 (1.102) -10.260 (1.124)
onein -0.058 (0.049) -0.056 (0.048) -7.606 (1.075) -7.402 (1.078)
gsp 0.859 (0.032) 1.127 (0.048) 0.556 (0.258) -2.214 (0.760)
bothin x ldist -0.017 (0.037) -0.030 (0.065) -0.054 (0.066)
bothin x lrgdp 0.029 (0.016) 0.071 (0.029) 0.057 (0.030)
bothin x lrgdppc 0.134 (0.025) 0.335 (0.047) 0.343 (0.048)
bothin x comlang 0.134 (0.067) 0.301 (0.117) 0.248 (0.121)
bothin x border 0.109 (0.197) 0.024 (0.254) 0.027 (0.250)
bothin x landl -0.048 (0.052) -0.127 (0.093) -0.117 (0.096)
bothin x island -0.035 (0.059) -0.101 (0.123) -0.075 (0.124)
bothin x lareap 0.052 (0.013) 0.101 (0.024) 0.114 (0.025)
bothin x comcol -0.193 (0.114) -0.606 (0.180) -0.584 (0.180)
bothin x curcol -1.890 (0.443) -3.914 (0.621) -3.737 (0.637)
bothin x colony 0.088 (0.186) 1.692 (0.253) 1.584 (0.281)
bothin x custrict 0.784 (0.219) 1.374 (0.352) 1.324 (0.352)
bothin x regional -0.589 (0.193) 0.271 (0.409) 0.237 (0.409)
bothin x gsp -0.458 (0.054) 0.108 (0.260) -0.051 (0.281)
onein x ldist -0.013 (0.063) -0.030 (0.064)
onein x lrgdp 0.053 (0.029) 0.045 (0.029)
onein x lrgdppc 0.246 (0.047) 0.252 (0.047)
onein x comlang 0.273 (0.116) 0.249 (0.117)
onein x border -0.077 (0.230) -0.093 (0.229)
onein x landl -0.099 (0.091) -0.094 (0.091)
onein x island -0.100 (0.119) -0.083 (0.119)
onein x lareap 0.057 (0.024) 0.065 (0.024)
onein x comcol -0.580 (0.175) -0.568 (0.175)
onein x colony 1.708 (0.239) 1.609 (0.261)
onein x custrict 0.674 (0.369) 0.647 (0.374)
onein x regional 1.167 (0.409) 1.079 (0.415)
onein x gsp 0.479 (0.261) 0.362 (0.281)
gsp x ldist 0.180 (0.045)
gsp x lrgdp 0.062 (0.018)
gsp x lrgdppc -0.018 (0.029)
gsp x comlang 0.188 (0.074)
gsp x border -1.545 (0.383)
gsp x landl -0.038 (0.060)
gsp x island -0.135 (0.064)
gsp x lareap -0.054 (0.014)
gsp x curcol -0.585 (0.402)
gsp x colony 0.141 (0.191)
gsp x comctry -1.421 (1.074)
gsp x custrict 0.169 (0.278)
gsp x regional 0.635 (0.279)
mean bothin effect -0.042 (0.053) -0.043 (0.001) 0.272 (0.002) 0.240 (0.002)
mean onein effect -0.058 (0.049) -0.056 (0.048) 0.272 (0.002) 0.241 (0.001)
mean gsp effect 0.859 (0.032) 1.127 (0.048) 0.556 (0.258) 0.718 (0.001)
R2 0.6480 0.6504† 0.6525† 0.6530†
Note:
1. OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported). Robust standard errors (clustering by dyads) are in the paren-
thesis. Some interaction terms are dropped due to collinearity.
2. When an effect is heterogeneous, the subject-wise effect equals the main effect plus the interaction effects scaled
by the subject’s covariates. The mean effect is estimated by the sample average of the subject-wise effects. When
an effect is assumed homogeneous, the mean effect estimate records the marginal effect estimate.
3. A superscript † over the R2 value indicates that the restricted default model (R2r) is rejected in favor of the
unrestricted model (R2u) at the conventional significance levels by the χ
2
q test of (N −κ)(R2u−R2r)/(1−R2u), where
N is the sample size, κ the number of parameters in the unrestricted model, and q the difference in the numbers of
parameters in the restricted and unrestricted models.
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